The Pakistani government has announced that it plans to ban the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, led by jailed former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and to file sedition charges against him and former President Arif Alvi, who is seen to be close to Khan.
The controversial decision, which has invited criticism and raised concerns about its implications for the country’s political stability, seems to have been prompted by the PTI’s continuing confrontation with the state institutions, particularly the powerful military establishment. The PTI’s anti-military rhetoric has seen it targeting even the top military leadership directly through social media platforms. Such attacks have intensified since the February 2024 general elections.
PTI appears to be increasingly frustrated as it accuses state institutions of interfering with their mandate during the elections. The leadership of PTI claims that they secured a two-thirds majority in the February elections, but it was later allegedly snatched from them.
Support from the judiciary has arguably emboldened the PTI. The courts have offered Khan and his party relief in numerous cases filed by the previous and the current government. The judiciary has even gone so far as to give the impression of “rewriting the constitution” to benefit the PTI. In a recent court filing, the Sunni Ithad Council, a PTI ally, sought reserved seats for women and minorities in national and provincial assemblies, which was previously denied by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the reserved seats.
Not only are cases against Khan being squashed by the courts but also the PTI’s position in Parliament has gotten stronger with the party gaining more lawmakers after the Supreme Court’s recent ruling allowing the PTI reserved seats for women and minorities.
The government’s decision to ban the PTI and file sedition charges against its leaders is likely to face challenges. Attempts by successive governments in the past to ban political parties have not been successful. These efforts were often rejected by the courts as unconstitutional and politically motivated. The planned ban on the PTI may come down to the same argument.
Nevertheless, it does seem that with the Shehbaz Sharif government meeting little success in dealing with Khan and the PTI politically, the road to banning the party has emerged as the next option. But the argument can also be made that the government and its supporters within state institutions feel more comfortable with going after the PTI more robustly at this juncture. So why now?
The Sharif government may have had plans to ban the PTI for some time, but couldn’t announce it given the country’s economic troubles and discussions for a new bailout program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the IMF talks done and dusted, this may have emerged as an opportune time for the government to strike against the PTI.
In a notable development, the Islamabad High Court recently accepted Imran Khan’s plea, granting him bail in a corruption case. Furthermore, a local court last month acquitted Khan in two cases registered against him in connection with the violent protests that erupted following his arrest on May 9 last year. Additionally, an Islamabad court last week acquitted the former prime minister and his wife Bushra Bibi in a controversial illegal marriage case. It appears that any newly filed cases against Khan are likely to meet a similar fate of being decided in favor of the PTI founder.
These rulings may have convinced the Sharif government and the military that certain sections of the judiciary are inclined to provide relief to the PTI, even in cases that require serious attention and investigation. This has prompted the government to challenge the court’s directives and to assert the supremacy of Parliament, rather than paying heed to the judiciary’s rulings.
The federal Cabinet will likely endorse the case for banning the PTI. This would be a challenge to the judiciary and raise the question of who is supreme: Parliament or the judiciary?
Moreover, the government and the security establishment may be sending a loud message to both the PTI and sections of the judiciary supporting it to speed up trials in cases relating to the May 9 riots. It may be recalled that the PTI faces charges related to terrorism for allegedly inciting mutiny within the armed forces with violent attacks and rioting against military installations that day. The courts have been dragging their feet on these cases and have not taken them seriously, despite the military’s repeated calls to deliver verdicts in these cases.
As a result, Pakistan appears to be more divided today than it was before the February 2024 general elections when there was some hope of stability returning to the country after polls. It appears that the situation has deteriorated even further, with distinct divisions now evident between the judiciary and the government, as well as the security establishment.
There appears to be no one to reconcile between the two camps at this stage. The situation may become even more messy if the courts take further steps that could be seen as undermining the interests of the government and the security establishment.
