The unconditional political, diplomatic and economic support offered by Beijing has been key to keeping the Bolivarian regime in power, from Chavez to Maduro.
It has always been believed that the Venezuelan government has been able to stay in power thanks to the support of Cuba and Russia or Iran. Although these governments have provided political, diplomatic, and military support to the Venezuelan regime, none has been as decisive as China in ensuring the continuity of both Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in power.
Over the last quarter-century, when the Bolivarian Revolution has been threatened, Beijing has provided economic support and political-diplomatic backing. With presidential elections just days away, China is once again the ally on which Venezuela’s ruling party relies.
The web of ties and interests that shape the strategic relationship between Caracas and Beijing began to take shape in 1999, when then-recently elected President Hugo Chávez proposed moving toward the construction of a multipolar world with alternative blocs to the “traditional” centers of power.
Guided by this premise, Chávez visited Beijing in 1999 and 2001, the starting signal for the China-Venezuela High-Level Joint Commission that elevated the diplomatic relationship to a Strategic Partnership for Shared Development. The scheme changed from prioritizing agriculture and energy to closer political, economic, commercial, and cultural ties.
In 2004, after winning a recall referendum, Chávez visited China to attract investments that would put him in an optimal position for his next battle: the 2006 elections. In addition to the cooperation instruments agreed, this marked the creation of what later became the China-Venezuela Joint Fund (FCCV): a loan-for-oil scheme that allowed Caracas to cope with difficulties in international financing.
The link was further strengthened, as the 2006-2012 period saw a massive flow of Chinese capital into Venezuela. Although the FCCV was the most relevant mechanism, infrastructure investments and trade exchanges also increased. In 2010, a new financing fund was created through which the Chinese government transferred $20 billion to Venezuelan coffers.
Venezuela’s dependence on China became increasingly evident. China became the Venezuelan government’s key lender as it sought monetary liquidity to keep the Chavista social program alive. The loans committed future oil production. The flow was enormous: $62 billion.
The financing instrument was used primarily to pave the way for Chávez’s re-election – his fourth term – in the 2012 elections. His government bought 3 million household appliances, thousands of houses, hundreds of buses, private cars, mobile phones and laptops. These “Chinese gifts” had a decisive influence on Chávez’s re-election.
After Chávez’s death in March 2013, the new leader of the ruling party, Nicolás Maduro, won election that April by a narrow margin over the opposition’s Henrique Capriles. The opposition and its international allies did not accept the results, alleging irregularities in the vote count. The following months were very turbulent for Maduro, as his original legitimacy was questioned by many countries.
In this context, China’s President Xi Jinping, who had also just come to power, received three key figures of the Venezuelan regime within four months: Diosdado Cabello, president of the National Assembly; Vice President Jorge Arreaza; and the disputed president-elect, Nicolás Maduro. Shortly afterward, Beijing upgraded the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and renewed the FCCV, providing Maduro with another $14 billion. This economic aid remained unchanged until the crisis caused by the collapse of the national oil industry.
Despite the slowdown in financing and the internal crisis that the South American country was beginning to suffer, Beijing continued to offer political support to Caracas. In 2016, part of the bilateral debt was renegotiated, which gave Caracas some breathing space before U.S. sanctions in 2017 and 2019 made the situation more difficult.
China then threw a new lifeline for the 2018 elections. Maduro was re-elected after altering democratic rules, amid accusations of fraud by the opposition. China was one of 14 countries to congratulate Maduro. In September of the same year, Xi received his Venezuelan counterpart and reiterated his desire to strengthen the bilateral relationship. And in 2019, when the then-president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself interim president, Beijing continued to recognize Maduro, using its veto power in the U.N. Security Council to block a resolution recognizing Guaidó as Venezuela’s legitimate president.
On the economic front, China maintained its support. It helped Caracas place its oil on the Chinese market when a U.S. oil embargo was in force and, in the context of the pandemic, Beijing sent Venezuela 110 tonnes of medical supplies, 1 million PCR test kits, 8 million masks, and 2 million gloves, as well as vaccines and other donations.
Chinese support was reciprocated by Maduro in all areas. His government provided backing in all the sensitive core concerns of Chinese foreign policy: the “One China” principle, which recognizes Taiwan as an inalienable part of China; the Hong Kong National Security Law; territorial disputes in the South China Sea; and rebuffing criticism of human rights abuses in Xinjiang and against the Uyghur community. The relationship between the two sides thus responded to a mutual political calculation, based on each side’s strategic interests.
In the current presidential campaign, China has once again become a key player in Maduro’s bid for six more years in power. On his visit to Beijing in 2023, the bilateral relationship was elevated to the status of an All-Weather Strategic Partnership. The cooperation model thus incorporates a new dynamic based on trade agreements in areas other than oil and giving prominence to subnational actors. With this new integration scheme, Caracas is taking the Chinese development model as an example for the reforms it wants to carry out.
In terms of domestic propaganda, Maduro has promised to build power plants and other works with Chinese capital, but has also expressed his desire to formalize full membership in BRICS, the group of emerging countries dominated by China. And Maduro boasts of Chinese support to guarantee his security in the event of a social conflict with the opposition. His alliance with China assures him of “cutting-edge technology, in drone and anti-drone (sic) combat,” he said. A few days ago Maduro threatened “bloodshed and civil war” if he and his party are ousted from power.
China has kept its side of the bargain. In March, when it was believed that Maduro would block the candidacy of the opposition United Platform, Beijing did not hesitate to back Venezuela’s electoral system while demanding that the U.S. government “avoid interference” in Venezuelan affairs. In June, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson questioned the “dispossession” to which Venezuela was being subjected by the U.S. through the “seizure” of CITGO Corp, a subsidiary of the state-owned oil and gas company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).
Paradoxically, while Chinese diplomacy frequently alludes to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of third countries, the unconditional political, diplomatic, and economic support offered by Beijing has been key to keeping the Bolivarian regime in power – a regime that runs counter to the principles of liberal representative democracy and extols the achievements of Chinese authoritarianism.
The inertia of this alliance is clearly visible. Both sides consider their relationship a strategic priority, especially Venezuela, which sees China as an ally in its struggle with the United States. The bond is strong in a number of areas, including economic, cultural, and military, but it is fundamentally political. Beijing has thus played a key role in the ruling party’s electoral victories, both in terms of economic aid to the late Chávez and support for Maduro when his legitimacy was questioned.
Not only must the idea of a neutral China in Venezuelan affairs be disproved, but it seems undeniable that China prefers a Venezuela with Maduro in power, as this guarantees it an unconditional ally in the midst of a much larger and more important geopolitical dispute with the United States. This does not exclude, however, the possibility that Beijing could develop normal relations with a Venezuelan opposition government led by Edmundo González Urrutia, a candidate who according to most polls has close to 60 percent support. In the event, Beijing will face a dilemma: Whether to continue to support its preferred ally, or to open itself to accepting a new stage in the bilateral relationship.
