Nonproliferation experts are expressing concern about South Korea’s nuclear aspirations, as yet another survey demonstrates high – 72.8 percent – public support for developing an indigenous nuclear arsenal. Two main factors are driving this nuclear desire. Despite the enhancement of the U.S. extended deterrence, North Korea continues to expand its nuclear arsenal, which is likely to be strengthened by its new ties with Russia. Like Charles de Gaulle, a former French President, South Koreans question U.S. nuclear assurance. These concerns are not new. In the 1980s, similar fears led President Park Chung-hee to initiate a nuclear weaponization program, including the nuclear program Project 890 and a missile program, in response to the increase of North Korea’s infiltrations and local provocations, coupled with U.S. military withdrawal plans.
Yet, there is skepticism over the feasibility of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. Dr. Siegfried Hecker warned that South Korea, which joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, would face significant, economic, diplomatic, and security challenges if it decides to develop a nuclear arsenal. Concerning the potentially high costs, it is doubtful whether these surveys accurately reflect South Koreans’ willingness to endure these costs. Instead, they overlook South Koreans’ rational response and the reality of the current domestic political environment.
Nonproliferation experts have widely cited surveys showing high public support for South Korea’s nuclear armament, especially following President Yoon Suk-yeol’s advocacy on January 11, 2023. Results from the Chicago Council on International Affairs, the Asan Institute, and the SAND Institute indicated a majority of South Koreans were in favor of nuclear possession. Subsequently, this proliferation concern led Yoon and U.S. President Joe Biden to establish the Washington Declaration to manage the emerging nuclear proliferation aspiration in South Korea. However, this year’s survey outcome still shows that support for South Korean nuclear weapons has not waned.
Do these surveys reflect the reality? Interestingly, all these surveys commonly exclude the costs of nuclear armament and simply ask whether responders support nuclear weaponization or not. This survey structure leads nonproliferation experts to cast doubt on the validity of the high support rates.
To satisfy the thirst for more nuanced surveys, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) showed that the support for developing indigenous nuclear weapons drops to 35 to 40 percent when all the costs – including economic sanctions, breakup of the South Korea-U.S. alliance, the risk of war, the costs of nukes, environmental damage, and national image – are considered. These findings suggest that while initial surveys with a high support rate reflect an intuitive reaction, an informed public reveals greater caution toward nuclear armament.
Victor Cha from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) identified similar patterns in a recent report, demonstrating that only 34 percent of the elites immediately supported nuclear armament, even though questions do not include costs.
For 10 years, KINU has consistently asked about the desire for South Korea to pursue nuclear weapons in surveys, and it found that “public opinion supporting nuclear armament has dropped significantly in recent years, contrary to media reports,” falling from a peak of 71.3 percent in 2021 to 69 percent in 2022 and 60.2 percent in 2023. KINU speculates that this drop in support is likely due to increased “awareness of the problems and costs associated with development and maintaining nuclear weapons.”
In addition to questions about the real level of public support, the current political environment in South Korea has demonstrated that nuclear armament is infeasible. In the 1970s, Park’s authoritarian leadership could concentrate all national resources on Project 890, due to a lack of checks and balances. However, the 21st century South Korean government inevitably requires legislative assistance for national projects as the National Assembly holds the power of the purse, as established by Article 54 of the constitution.
Following the April legislative election, opposition parties now dominate the 300-seat National Assembly with 192 seats, almost two-thirds of the total. The ruling People Power Party (PPP), with only 108 seats, cannot support the Yoon administration’s national projects without cooperation from the opposition.
Notably, the two major liberal opposition parties, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), which together hold 182 seats, explicitly advocate for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in their party constitutions. In contrast, the conservative PPP does not, leaving several PPP legislators as the sole advocates in the National Assembly for building a nuclear arsenal.
Conservative politicians’ statements supporting nuclear armament likely aim to divert public attention from internal problems and bolster their domestic standing. According to the Gallup Poll, Yoon’s approval rate is very low, below than 30 percent. Particularly, it dropped after the PPP’s defeat in the April election and Yoon’s repeated use of veto power against a special probe bill investigating his alleged abuse of power in the case of a Marine’s death last year. This week, PPP members, along with security and conservative groups, announced their plan to initiate an online petition aiming for 10 million signatures in support of South Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
Yet the Yoon administration has begun to distance itself from such efforts. In an interview with Reuters in early August, South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik rejected nuclear weaponization by saying it would cause “a huge crack in the U.S. alliance” and “an immediate shock in our financial market.”
A few weeks ago, Kim Joon-hyung, an RKP legislator and a former chancellor of Korea National Diplomatic Academy, raised suspicions regarding the existence of a group in both South Korea and the United States that advocates for South Korea’s nuclear armament in connection with the Sue Mi Terry incident.
The debate over South Korea’s nuclear armament is still unresolved. While immediate security concerns drive the high public support for nuclear armament in South Korea, the significant challenges and costs associated with such a path make it an unlikely and infeasible solution under the current political environment. However, there is a need for more nuanced public surveys taking into account the costs of nuclear armament to better measure the rational responses of the South Korean public. Also, there is a need to reassess the current U.S. strategy toward North Korea, including its emphasis on extended deterrence, which has been ineffective in alleviating South Koreans’ immediate nuclear fears.
To address South Korea’s nuclear ambitions and alleviate its security concerns, the United States should consider adjusting its extended deterrence strategy, incorporating reassurance measures to maintain regional stability and prevent nuclear proliferation.
