India and Japan have just concluded their 2+2 ministerial dialogue. On the one hand, the talks demonstrated significant progress in the relationship over the past few years—a positive trend from Australia’s point of view. On the other, it is difficult to avoid the sense that most of the accomplishments were the low-hanging fruit in the relationship, and progress in further deepening ties would require significant political investment on both sides, which is not yet visible.
The India-Japan 2+2 began in 2019, one of several such dialogues that India and its partners initiated in the Indo-Pacific. Though it was meant to be an annual affair, this was the only the third such meeting since 2019. Nevertheless, the joint statement listed an impressive set of achievements. These included Japanese participation in bilateral and multilateral air exercises hosted by the Indian Air Force, and bilateral military exercises by all three services in 2023—the first time this has happened in a single calendar year.
In addition, there has been a steady drumbeat of dialogues on issues including disarmament and non-proliferation; cyber security and counterterrorism. A particular emphasis for both countries is the UN Security Council reform. Even though this still seems a somewhat distant ambition, both sides continue to discuss pathways forward in promoting such reforms.
As well as security cooperation, India is clearly interested in technology transfers from Japan—an area that New Delhi has been keen to develop with other strategic partners, especially those with access to high-end technology such as its Quad partners, the United States, Japan and Australia.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar emphasised this point in his statement, asking that Japan ‘look into the current regulatory bottlenecks’ that might be standing in the way of such technology sharing. India has stressed that, rather than simply buying Japanese defence platforms, it is more interested in joint research, design, development, testing and production. This would likely enhance India’s own technological base. But technology sharing is always difficult because even close security partners guard their national technological assets jealously. For example, despite Jaishankar’s request, the joint statement made no reference to any progress on this issue.
Moreover, it is unclear how much progress was made in previous efforts. For example, India and Japan collaborated in a joint research project on unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) robotics—though it seems possible this did not lead to the development of any actual vehicles. The collaboration was revealed by the first 2+2 ministerial dialogue in 2019 and mentioned again in 2020 by the Japanese Ministry of Defense as an example of defence equipment and technology co-operation with partner countries. The initiative was quite forward-looking, considering the development of such UGVs in the context of the Ukraine war.
The latest joint statement says the project is complete, but what this means is unclear. Japan has contracted for three THeMIS UGVs from Estonian firm Milrem Robotics, which suggests that the India-Japan research project has not produced any UGVs. The two countries did announce transfer of the unified complex radio antenna (UNICORN) and related technologies, communication gear that are deployed on Japanese stealth warships.
India’s other partners in the Quad and in the Indo-Pacific such as Australia should be pleased with the progress in India-Japan security ties. They all have an interest in creating a mesh of security partnerships to maintain greater stability in the region. Such a security mesh will be strengthened significantly if India is part of it. Indeed, other bilateral and minilateral partnerships have been accelerating in the region, including AUKUS, the Japan-Australia defence agreement, the UK-Japan defence agreement and the growing security ties between Japan and South Korea.
Nevertheless, Jaishankar’s press release and the joint statement, read together, suggest that while progress has been made, there are no major initiatives in the works to propel the relationship to the next stage. Again, this might have parallels with India’s other security partnerships, including with Australia and even the US. India and its partners can only do so many military exercises and bilateral and minilateral dialogues.
It is possible that New Delhi is satisfied with what it has achieved already, and does not want to further deepen security ties beyond its desire for technology. But this leads to a quandary because India’s partners may not be willing to transfer the kind of technology that India wants at the current level of partnership.
It is therefore possible that India and its security partners—including Japan—need to figure out a new equilibrium in their strategic partnership that satisfies the needs of both sides.
