Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong hosted their Japanese counterparts, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Defence Minister Minoru Kihara, for 2+2 consultations in Victoria on 5 September. ASPI experts give their perspectives on what was announced and why the Australia-Japan partnership really matters.
Alex Bristow, senior analyst
Australian ministers should be applauded for joining their Japanese counterparts in a strong rebuke of China’s coercive actions, including the recent incursions into Japanese territory by the PLA. As Justin Bassi and I pointed out before the meeting, this was necessary and overdue.
The tone was set from Marles’s opening comments, in which he referred to Japan being ‘very much on the front line’ against pressure from China, North Korea and Russia. Such candour is welcome, if sobering.
Wong and Kamikawa framed a series of new initiatives and dialogues—ranging from economic security, Pacific digital development, working with the US on strategic communications and attributing cyber attacks—in terms of coordinating the levers of national power towards a collective purpose.
We’ve heard the spin on so-called statecraft for a while, but thankfully we now seem to be seeing the substance.
Cathy Moloney, deputy director
Welcome undertakings included bolstering the commitment to collective deterrence against force and coercion in the Indo-Pacific and an agreement to build deterrence, response capabilities and interoperability through enhanced cooperation.
Australia is emphasising support for Japan’s capability acquisitions, such as long-range missiles, and fostering Japan’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities.
This reinforces our national defence deterrence strategy, which is augmented by both Japan’s and Australia’s current and future defence efforts on maritime cooperative activities with the Philippines and on networked air and missile defence with the US.
Leveraging the US as the major Australian and Japanese ally in the region will further consolidate our resilience and security capabilities against threats and demonstrate Australia’s dedication to integrated deterrence operations with partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Euan Graham, senior analyst
The ministers indicated their interest in exploring new initiatives that will further integrate bilateral and trilateral defence activities, with the emphasis on making Japan’s military footprint in Australia deeper and more regular via mutual staff placements, visiting detachments and joint exercises, including with US forces here.
From later this year, Canberra and Tokyo will embed military officers in each other’s joint structures, a move which should streamline planning and which indicates growing trust.
Also on the agenda are reciprocal deployments of Australian, Japanese and US F-35s, perhaps including Japanese detachments operating from northern Australia. Japan may also participate in joint amphibious training with Australia and the US Marines. This highlights Australia’s importance as a strategic location for Japan to disperse its mobile assets in case its own bases come under military threat.
Significantly, Japan and Australia have underlined their desire to cooperate on counterstrike capabilities, to boost their military reach and deterrence against common adversaries.
Raji Pillai Rajagopalan, resident senior fellow
The references to trilaterilising as much work of the two countries as possible, apparently meaning adding the US to their programs, was positive. So was the reference by Marles to an emerging ‘lattice of networks’ and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific as a means to strengthen the rules-based regional order.
It would have been better to include the Quad in this context and not limit the public remarks to the bilateral or trilateral. In this way it was a missed opportunity for both countries to express deep support for the importance of the Quad. It may be that the Quad was underplayed due to a desire not to present it as a security grouping. But the Quad must play both a positive capacity-building role and a security one for it to be most effective. It would have been best for the public and region to hear this clearly.
All partners in these minilaterals, including India, appreciate other partnerships even if they are not involved. They understand that the bilaterals, trilaterals (such as Australia-Japan-US and AUKUS), the Quad and even the Five Eyes all make up the ‘lattice of networks’ that is designed to enhance the security and well-being of the region.
Malcolm Davis, senior analyst
Ministers didn’t mention the important area of space in their public remarks.
In fact, it is important for Japan and Australia to strengthen defence cooperation in space. A joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellite constellation would allow Tokyo and Canberra to target long-range strike missiles and track and intercept Chinese missile threats.
Space capabilities must be resilient against Chinese counterspace threats. Japan, like Australia, is a member of the Combined Space Operations initiative, which seeks to sustain freedom of action in space, enhance resilience and deter conflict. Working together to deter counterspace threats through building a common space control capability is a step forward for Australia and Japan.
Cooperation between Japan and Australia on operationally responsive space launch, including from launch sites in Australia, would also contribute towards space resilience and deterrence by denial in orbit.
