When grappling with an opponent straining at their utmost, a choke is not instantaneous—but it still hurts. Commerce raiding predates the Peloponnesian Wars, but in a future conflict it may help throttle Beijing’s true center of gravity: their control of 1.4 billion people. China relies on uninterrupted overseas trade and stable economic growth and it simply cannot afford a long war. Allied surface forces can and should establish sea control—just not where one might expect.
Goliath Feeds from Afar
In 2020, China consumed over 14 million barrels of oil per day (BPD) in peace time. About 600,000 BPD came overland through Russian pipelines, with Kazakhstan accounting for an additional 400,000 BPD. In 2019, China produced a mere 3.83 million BPD domestically. Approximately 62 percent of China’s oil must come by sea, beyond their missile umbrella, under the nose of the U.S. 5th Fleet.
The Department of Defense (DoD) estimates China’s 600-million-barrel strategic petroleum reserve represents a 90 day-supply. Beijing can offset deficits with coal and natural gas, but their war machine runs on oil. China also suffers from chronic food insecurity, feeding one fifth of the world’s population with only seven percent of its arable land. As a net food importer, disruption to American, Brazilian, or Australian grain imports could be disastrous.
In stark contrast, U.S. oil demands are 20.5 million BPD, with the ability to domestically pump 17 million BPD. No overseas oil imports can be interdicted by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). U.S. farmland is the most productive in the world, with only a fraction of China’s population to feed. COVID-19’s economic damage is still being calculated, but the pandemic exposed Western vulnerabilities to a Chinese dominated supply chain. Essential manufacturing has since been quietly reshored to Mexico, Vietnam, and other friendlier economies.
The Far Blockade
Commerce raiding and sanctions represent a vital strategy that must be executed in tandem with a methodical assault westward. United States Central Command (CentCom) is well positioned to destroy Chinese power projection, manifested through China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) facilities in Djibouti and the Arabian Gulf. U.S. ships can range far into the Indian Ocean, interdicting China’s sea lines of communication (SLOC) as surface raiders. Less capable allied frigates, corvettes, and even littoral combat ships (LCSs) can free up precious guided missile destroyers (DDGs). While economic and diplomatic pressure should be used to divert merchantmen before the use of force, recent conflicts in the Red Sea underline shipping vulnerability to relatively unsophisticated forces.
A far blockade would be difficult, but effective over time. Thirty days of high intensity conflict would dip deeply into China’s war reserve of energy and food. Captured oil could be diverted to allied refineries (or sold to an oil-hungry India). The same could be done with grain and other strategic commodities, offsetting the disruption to allied economies. Logistically, China cannot sustain distant combat, especially if the United States destroyed their bases from the Gulf of Aden to Myanmar.
Royal Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Australian forces will be needed to defend critical shipping to East Asia, lest Beijing interdict them. China is unlikely to send forces far beyond their A2/AD umbrella to shepherd tankers home. If they choose to target allied shipping, they risk depleting their magazines and counterattack.
A Bloody High-End Fight
China’s local superiority in sensors and firepower make for a dangerous nut to crack. Ground based antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) with potential hypersonic capability reduce a defender’s reaction time, even if they have an interceptor to match.1 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) warships and aircraft also bristle with long range missiles, many supersonic. Shaping operations to reduce enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be conducted in all domains beforehand.
U.S. forces should initially maintain a wary distance. Scores of drones and patrol aircraft would likely be lost on the periphery as each side forms their respective sensor frontier. Throwing an ill-timed punch could result in the loss of multiple carriers and squadrons of irreplaceable aviators.
However, the first island chain is not impenetrable. China’s Yaogan ELINT, radar, and Earth Observation (EO) satellite constellations form the “eyes and ears” of their A2/AD architecture. Localized platforms (long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, submarines, patrol aircraft, ISR balloons) provide target quality track data needed to complete kill chains. These platforms are networked, expensive, and finite. Their neutralization through electronic warfare, cyber, or kinetic means would create gaps in coverage that could be widened and exploited by a skillful commander. Delaying a full-scale counterattack would buy time to mobilize reservists for support duty and refresher training, freeing up active personnel for force generation.
