Japan Center for Economic Research, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs for the privilege to address you here at my first Mt Fuji Dialogue. And I am so very glad to be here, to acknowledge and celebrate the strength of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, to mark the tremendous strides we have taken in recent years, and to offer just a few thoughts for the future.
It is no secret that the Indo-Pacific region is experiencing dramatic changes. You will hear that from many of today’s participants. The regional security landscape is heavily impacted by China’s rapid military modernization, increasing provocations abroad, and comprehensive repression at home. The combination of emerging capability, operational activity, and routine dismissal of regional and global norms cannot be explained as simply defensive in nature. We have surpassed any reasonable explanation that China’s intent is benign. Rather, these developments reflect an unyielding ambition to rewrite the international code that has delivered prosperity and security to this region over the past eight decades.
For this reason, the United States has dubbed the PRC as the Department of Defense’s Pacing Challenge. It is the yardstick against which we measure ourselves. And I am pleased to report that we are measuring up; measuring up with historic investments in munitions and platforms, significantly upgraded command and control, critical developments in doctrine, concepts, and integration, and so many other areas.
But the greatest developments are those that we are accomplishing through deepened ties with likeminded countries across this region.
As Secretary Austin noted in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue this May, we are witnessing a “new convergence” around all aspects of security in the region, producing a stronger, more resilient, and more capable network of partnerships. This shift is defining a new era of security — propelled by a shared vision, underpinned by common principles and a collective obligation to uphold the rules-based international order.
This new convergence is only the beginning, as the United States and other likeminded countries from across the region marshal our combined efforts to withstand the destabilizing pressures that continue to mount. Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance, is at the center of this effort.
Together, we have embarked on a robust security agenda in recent years. We have modernized our alliance roles, missions, and capabilities, expanded our defense industrial cooperation, and enhanced our force posture.
Let’s take stock of only a handful of key developments. First, Japan’s resolve to bolster its capabilities has contributed greatly to Alliance modernization. Tokyo has committed to increase annual defense spending to 2 per cent of GDP and is now focusing its historic levels of investment on acquiring new capabilities, most significantly standoff capabilities, such as long-range precision strike.
Building upon this, the United States and Japan have deepened bilateral cooperation toward the effective operation of Japanese counterstrike capabilities, officially starting the training pipeline and ship modifications for Japan to acquire operational capability of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile.
Japan also committed to enhancing the Self Defense Forces’ joint operational architecture by standing up the JSDF Joint Operations Command — or “JJOC.” Building on this, in July Secretary Austin announced the historic decision to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) to a three-star Joint Force Headquarters with expanded missions and operational responsibilities. This is the most significant change to USFJ since its creation, and one of the strongest improvements in our military ties with Japan in 70 years.
Second, the Alliance has strengthened defense industry and advanced technology cooperation. In April, President Biden and former Prime Minister Kishida announced a new Forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS), intended to leverage our respective industrial bases to meet the demand for critical capabilities and maintain readiness over the long term. We convened the first forum plenary in June and launched four working groups focused on missile co-production, ship and aircraft repair, and supply chain resilience.
In 2023, we also announced the U.S.-Japan Glide Phase Interceptor Cooperative Development project to counter high-end, regional hypersonic threats. The development of a counter-hypersonic capability addresses emerging sophisticated missile threats, and builds upon long-standing missile defense cooperation.
This year, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States also announced the intent to cooperate with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects. AUKUS partners and Japan are now exploring opportunities to improve interoperability of their maritime autonomous systems as an initial area of cooperation.
Third, the Alliance has adapted its posture to deter dynamic threats. Last year in Okinawa, the Marine Corps redesignated the 12th Marine Regiment as the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, an upgrade to one of the most advanced formations in the Marine Corps. In February at Yokohama, the Army activated its first composite watercraft company outside the United States in decades. And in July, DoD announced a modernization plan for tactical aircraft based in Japan, including at Kadena Air Base, Misawa Air Base, and Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. Through these steps, the United States continues its commitment to deploying cutting-edge defense capabilities to Japan.
The Alliance is also steadily implementing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, including the construction of relocation facilities and land returns in Okinawa. In January, we resumed reclamation and construction work for the Futenma Replacement Facility at Henoko. As both governments have announced, the relocation of Marine Corps personnel from Okinawa to Guam also begins this year — another milestone in service of our realignment efforts.
Finally, the Alliance has strengthened multilateral cooperation with like-minded partners in the region. In July, Secretary Austin and his Japanese and South Korean counterparts signed the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework here in Tokyo, institutionalizing U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation as envisioned by the 2023 Camp David Summit. We have advanced systematic cooperation on trilateral exercises, including the recently completed exercise FREEDOM EDGE, and we have improved real-time mechanisms to share data on common threats.
With Australia, we are committed to increasing trilateral force posture cooperation and are exploring opportunities for rotational deployments of the JSDF to Australia. Both countries also announced Australian participation in the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Information Analysis Cell, layering our trilateral cooperation from the leader-level down to the operator-level.
The United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines have also committed to coordinate security assistance programs to enhance Philippine capabilities to do even more for itself; and these partners are now conducting regular multilateral maritime cooperative activities in the South China Sea. You don’t need me to spell it out; the message is clear. We will not tolerate unilateral use of force to change the status quo.
At the U.S.-Japan-Australia-India Quad summit in September, the leaders announced the launch of the Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, which will leverage our collective logistics strengths to support civilian response to natural disasters more rapidly and efficiently across the Indo-Pacific. I hope that you will agree with me when I say that the U.S.-Japan alliance is flourishing, not only in words, but very much in practice.
These past four years are only the beginning. Looking ahead, we must further embrace the “new convergence” in the Indo-Pacific region — solving key strategic and operational problems together.
For example, we must solve for defense industrial base vulnerabilities. And we must do it quickly. In October the United States, Japan, and nearly a dozen other governments announced a first ever global consortium focused on unlocking new sources of supply and new opportunities for co-production and co-sustainment right here in the Indo-Pacific. The Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience — or PIPIR — holds tremendous potential to strengthen the potency and durability of our defense relationships, creating economic and strategic win-wins.
I was thrilled to join Undersecretary LaPlante, ATLA Commissioner Ishikawa, and the representatives of other PIPIR participants for this historic launch only a month ago.
Going forward we must also contend with an emboldened DPRK, pouring weapons and now combat forces into Russia and entering the Russia-Ukraine war as a co-belligerent, likely in exchange for advanced technology and political support on the international stage.
I am not suggesting that we now perceive a single theater of operations between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, but I would say we must acknowledge a single theater of consequence. And therein we will see further adjustments in the relationships between Pyongyang, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and perhaps others. The shape and character of security in Europe will have new and revelatory implications on this region.
As a former U.S. representative to NATO, I was pleased and proud that the NATO summit in Washington this past July included — for the third consecutive time — participation from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea at the highest level. And for the first time the Defense Ministers from these same Indo-Pacific nations joined Defense Ministers in Brussels last month to discuss global security developments. As Japan deepens dialogue and cooperation with NATO and European partners, we look forward to identifying additional collaborative opportunities to showcase how deepened NATO-Japanese cooperation can provide mutual benefits for both Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.
These are just two examples that merit the time, attention and focus of the new leadership in Japan and the incoming leadership of the United States. None of these efforts will come easy. But in the United States, across the United States government, and across our political landscape, you’ll find a strong and bipartisan commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. We have done more together than anyone predicted in recent years. The United States is deeply committed to this region, and we are preparing for even greater success.
