The Royal Australian Navy’s greatest challenge isn’t introducing nuclear submarines and considerably expanding the surface fleet, as daunting as those objectives are. Rather, it is transitioning from a peacetime force to one with a maritime warfighting culture capable of employing these vessels effectively.
That shift must be anchored in a unifying principle: warfighting mariners first. The principle should unify all naval members around a shared warfighting mariner identity, regardless of role.
Naval theorists have long observed that navies shaped by prolonged peacetime tend to optimise for peacetime demands, rather than warfighting. In The Rules of the Game, Andrew Gordon demonstrates how a peacetime naval culture in the Royal Navy before World War I, shaped by promotion systems, accountability mechanisms and informal professional norms, persisted into battle and constrained command behaviour at the moment initiative mattered most.
The US Navy also learned this lesson early in the Pacific war. Around 30 percent of submarine commanding officers were relieved between 1942 and 1943, not for lack of competence but because they had been shaped by a peacetime system that rewarded caution and procedural compliance.
This is not the familiar debate over ratcatchers versus regulators. It is a more fundamental conversation about the purpose of a navy and how that purpose must drive the structure, skills and culture of the RAN.
This is easier said than done: articulating intent is far simpler than making and selling hard choices. The lesson from the US Pacific submarine campaign, the Battle of Jutland and wider naval history is clear. A navy cannot assume it can simply switch to warfighting when required. The question then is what the blueprint for warfighting mariners first should be.
The first step lies in personnel structure. Does the RAN have the right mix of officers and sailors for the task ahead? In the first quarter of this century, it expanded the number of officer and sailor workgroups with no or limited seagoing roles. Some of this growth improved bureaucratic functions, while some supported emerging capabilities, particularly in the cyber and space domains. But the question now is whether these workgroups are essential for a navy that must rapidly expand its seagoing footprint. The uncomfortable answer is that some are not. The follow-on questions are whether these roles are essential to the Australian Defence Force and if so, whether they belong in other services. Generating cyber and space professionals across all three services, for example, is inefficient. Either the army or air force should be designated as the lead service to provide personnel for this the capability, allowing the RAN to refocus on its core task at sea.
Where these functions are bureaucratic and have no seagoing role, the question is whether they are better performed by civilians or by seagoing personnel who have reached a stage in their career where seagoing service is no longer required or no longer feasible.
This is not about devaluing individual or workgroup contributions but about whether the RAN is structured around its core purpose. Recruitment targets alone will not sustain an expanded surface fleet and nuclear-powered submarines without increasing the proportion of the workforce with a genuine seagoing liability.
Once the core workgroups of a warfighting navy are consolidated, the next step is training. If the RAN is to unify around the principle of mariners first, every workgroup must possess a baseline level of warfighting mariner skills. This will be unpopular in some quarters, but it is essential. Beyond reorienting the RAN around its core purpose, this would build depth and redundancy so personnel can go to sea when required or support broader maritime mobilisation. The hard reality is that naval war is a war of attrition. If conflict comes, the RAN will need a deep and resilient pool of trained mariners to draw from.
After structure and training comes promotion and pay. Promotion reform is achievable within existing arrangements; pay reform is not. As Gordon’s analysis of Jutland shows, promotion systems that reward compliance and risk avoidance in peacetime shape behaviour in war, constraining initiative when it matters most. The services are not interchangeable, and integrated promotion structures will not help the RAN select the leaders it needs to crew and command ships at sea.
Pay is harder. The legislated structure of the Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal limits flexibility, but a remuneration system that disincentivises arduous seagoing roles will ultimately defeat any attempt to reform navy culture or structure. This issue cannot be avoided, even if it requires legislative change.
Responding to the deteriorating strategic environment and preparing for future conflict requires a fundamental shift. It demands a culture focused on warfighting at sea and unified by the principle of mariners first. History is unambiguous on this point. From Jutland to the US submarine campaign in the Pacific, navies shaped by peacetime systems do not automatically adapt in war.
This shift will not occur by declaration. It requires a deliberate blueprint for structural change. For the RAN, that means consolidating officer and sailor workgroups, establishing a baseline level of mariner qualification and warfighting understanding across the workforce, and aligning promotion systems to support a warfighting culture. These changes will be difficult and, in some cases, unpopular. But they are necessary if the RAN is to prepare its people for the challenges ahead.
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