Proposals for nuclear power in Australia will have to take national security risks into account.
As evidenced in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report released in September, Russia’s occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine continues to create high risk of a nuclear disaster. In considering future conflicts, no one can safely assume that an enemy will avoid targeting nuclear power stations.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats to use nuclear weapons and new nuclear doctrine are alarming. But, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned at the United Nations on 25 September, the immediate nuclear risk is at Zaporizhzhia.
The Zaporizhzhia plant has been on or near the frontline since the Russian invasion in February 2022, exposed to nearby combat and, since Russian seizure in March 2022, dangerous mismanagement. There is significant risk of an accidental or intentional nuclear incident at the plant.
It is no longer tenable to argue that nuclear power plants are protected in conflicts by taboo. This must be considered as the Australian Liberal-National opposition proposes building seven major nuclear power plants and two small modular reactors in Australia.
The IAEA, the global nuclear watchdog, has been clear on the risks associated with the Zaporizhzhia plant. As established in the most recent and earlier reports, Russia’s actions during the conflict have either partially or fully compromised all seven of the IAEA’s ‘indispensable pillars’ of nuclear security. Notably, this framework was developed only in response to the invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s unprecedented wartime targeting and occupation of nuclear facilities.
Physical integrity (Pillar 1) and safety and security systems (Pillar 2) have been compromised by damage to the plant from direct attacks and nearby combat. The plant was first shelled in March 2022 when Russia seized control. More recently, on 27 June, an external radiation monitoring system 16km away was destroyed by shelling—which also compromised radiation monitoring and emergency preparedness (Pillar 6).
Drone strikes targeted the plant in April and July, and IAEA monitoring teams at the plant reported nearby explosions as recently as September. In August, fires at the plant coincided with the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, with large amounts of smoke billowing from a cooling tower.
In 2023, Russia conducted unauthorised structural changes and Russian forces even stored explosives in proximity to a nuclear reactor. Additionally, anti-personnel mines were also laid between the plant’s inner and outer fences in 2022, and more mines were laid in January 2024.
The capacity of operating staff, (Pillar 3) has been affected by the treatment of Ukrainian employees at the plant, including physical violence and torture, some fatal, by occupying Russian military and security forces. Workers have also been denied access to critical security systems and exposed to high stress. The chain of command has become unclear, resulting in conflicting messages to workers.
Shelling and other damage to the nearby city of Enerhodar has left workers and their families in poor living conditions, intermittently without power or fresh water supply. By early 2024, Ukrainian employees were reportedly no longer permitted at the facility. It is now operating with a personnel shortage: the plant has about 5000 workers, down from the pre-war peak of 11,000. In May, remaining staff were reporting severe psychological stress.
Russia has also weakened the facility’s necessary off-site power supply (Pillar 4). Since Russia tried to connect it to the Russian energy grid, the plant has lost three 750kV power lines and five of its 330kV backup power lines. It now operates with one of each and has suffered eight complete losses of off-site power. External power supply is essential to secure operation of the plant and continued operation of safety systems. In early 2024, the plant went 23 consecutive days without a backup connection.
As for Pillar 5 (an uninterrupted supply chain), the IAEA has reported the plant’s fragile logistics for spare or replacement parts and safety equipment. This is in part due to reliance on equipment from Western suppliers. Pillar 7, the requirement for reliable communications, has been compromised by the limitations on communication between the plant and the Ukrainian energy grid operator.
Additional threats have come from the destruction of the Kakhovka dam in June 2023, an event that is widely attributed to Russia. This reduced water supply to the Zaporizhzhia plant for cooling reactors and spent fuel.
Russia has targeted other Ukrainian nuclear facilities, too. The Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkiv, which housed a small experimental reactor, was destroyed from the air in March 2022. Moscow has also continually spread disinformation and stoked nuclear fears, most recently regarding the security of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant after the Ukrainian advance into the region.
This is a lesson on the vulnerability of nuclear infrastructure during a conflict. Political leaders and policymakers must pay attention to it as they consider domestic energy policy.
