A new element of strategic competition is emerging in the Southern Ocean—in Australia’s backyard—in the form of Beijing’s push to control and exploit fisheries. The situation demands that we bolster capability while also cultivating consensus on the need to revise agreements to match the strategic realities of today.
Last week, the 43rd meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) failed to establish either new fisheries agreements, or new protected marine zones in the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR hasn’t established a new marine conservation area since 2016. Worse, the meeting failed even to renew management agreements already in place.
CCAMLR was established in 1982 with an objective to conserve Antarctic and Southern Ocean marine life. It isa central component of the Antarctic Treaty system. Australia proudly publicises its role, beyond hosting the CCAMLR secretariat, as chasing the ‘important related goal [of enhancing] Australia’s influence in the Antarctic Treaty system [and maintaining] Australia’s reputation as a responsible manager of marine resources’.
But with food security a rising strategic priority for Beijing, it is looking to more fully exploit the waters of the Southern Ocean. Recent court rulings in China underscore the central role so-called ‘distant water fisheries’ (DWF) have in Beijing’s long-term security strategy. Earlier this year, China’s highest court awarded subsidies to one DWF enterprise ‘on the grounds that fishing in international waters is a strategic national priority’.
Krill is at the heart of a resource race in the Southern Ocean. The tiny, shrimp-like crustaceans are foundational to Antarctic and Southern Ocean marine life, and indeed are a key component of the global food chain. In recent years, the economic value of krill has been (re)discovered thanks to the boom in the global health supplement sector.
China has the largest distant water fishing fleet on earth. According to its own 2022 white paper on the Development of Distant Water Fisheries, China has 177 approved enterprises and 2551 vessels in the DWF sector operating on the high seas around the world. And that’s just what Beijing tells us about.
China is also working to popularise the notion of ‘sustainable use’ of fishery resources. Deployment of research vessels to map resource deposits is normalised daily business, often branded as an activity to help understand any protective requirements of the Southern Ocean. Untangling the strategies of resource use from efforts of resource protection is onerous.
Significantly, last week’s CCAMLR meeting was the first since Beijing inked new laws for China’s Coast Guard (CCG). Revisions to CCG law came into effect in June 2024, including new powers to arrest and detain foreigners undertaking ‘illegal violation in waters under China’s jurisdiction’ for up to 60 days without trial. But strikingly it does not define waters under China’s jurisdiction. Would the Southern Ocean fall under the expanded notion of CCG jurisdiction as part of China’s ‘national security interests’?
Furthermore, CCG law supports the creation of ‘temporary maritime security zones’ for its military’s use of the sea. Relevant to recent CCAMLR developments, it codifies Beijing’s intent to protect ‘important fishery waters’ and ‘fishery production operations’.
For decades, China has worked to lay foundations—indeed its own definitions of precedents—for its claims in the South China Sea. The potential for China to apply its CCG law to the Southern Ocean is obvious.
When it comes to international cooperation, we can blame certain states for frustrating consensus, but this does not mean we should walk away from such bodies as CCAMLR. There is merit in engaging even for performative reasons—that is, showing up and looking interested—as many other states do, so long as we are building our capacity to defend and deter with credible naval presence in the background. Or perhaps more aptly for maritime capability stretched Australia—pooling our kit with like-minded states.
Beijing is deliberately blurring the lines between using and protecting living resources in the Southern Ocean. It is consistently vetoing or blocking new marine protection efforts in CCAMLR by stating it needs to undertake more research. Want to protect a stretch of the Southern Ocean? Beijing needs to see or undertake scientific research supporting the call for protection.
Then there are questions as to the identity of personnel on China’s super-trawlers already active in the Southern Ocean. While we know China’s Coast Guard is mandated to protect these assets and their operations, could these fishermen also don military uniforms to execute the Chinese Communist Party’s strategic endeavours? This is surely not implausible.
Consensus bodies like CCAMLR are failing because international dynamics have evolved beyond the 1980s when they were established. Therefore our thinking must also evolve. Considering our AUKUS partners share a litany of strategic interests in the Southern Ocean, perhaps it is time to plan a ‘polar pillar’ for AUKUS. This could deliver technological enhancements from next-gen extreme-weather remote sensors to unmanned aerial vehicles and, of course, enhanced geospatial intelligence cooperation. Hopefully we can get creative and have some viable solutions to act on before the China’s first ‘temporary maritime security zone’ pops up in the Southern Ocean.
