Introduction
China’s recent military exercises in the South China Sea (SCS, 南海, nanhai) — including live-fire night drills, high-speed naval manoeuvres, and coordinated helicopter operations — reflect a broader, long-term strategic trajectory. Beijing is steadily consolidating its maritime presence, reinforcing territorial and resource claims, and shaping the regional balance of power. These activities are embedded in a dynamic cycle of strategic adaptation: China, the United States (U.S.), allied powers, and regional states continuously adjust deployments, partnerships, and policies in response to perceived maritime security threats.
Southeast Asian states respond in diverse and nuanced ways. Indonesia, and Malaysia largely pursue strategic hedging (战略对冲, zhanlüe duichong), balancing economic engagement with China while maintaining security ties with the U.S. and other partners. The Philippines and Vietnam actively balance through its alliance with Washington, whereas Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar tend toward bandwagoning (搭便车, dabianche) to maximise economic and diplomatic benefits from
Beijing. This spectrum of strategic postures underscores the Association of Southeast Asian Nation’s (ASEAN) agency: the bloc is not merely reactive, but actively shaping its own approaches to maintain autonomy amid intensifying great-power competition (大国竞争, daguo jingzheng).
The stakes in this maritime contest extend far beyond territorial claims. Control over sea lanes, rare-earth elements (REEs, 稀土元素, xitu yuansu), forward-operating bases, and maritime infrastructure has become central to the broader strategic rivalry. The SCS sits at the nexus of economic, technological, and military influence, linking local maritime disputes to a contest for power, resources, and regional norms. The expansion of China’s ‘ten-dash line’ (十段线, shiduan xian) in 2023 further underscores the symbolic and strategic importance Beijing places on maritime control, embedding national rejuvenation (民族复兴, minzu fuxing) into its maritime strategy.
China’s Strategic Interests and Ambitions
China’s maritime strategy in the SCS is driven by a mix of history, nationalism, and long-term strategic calculation. The old, yet misleading ‘nine dash line’ (九段线, jiuduan xian) — once the symbol of its maritime claims — has evolved in Beijing’s latest cartography: its 2023 official ‘Standard Map’ (标准地图, biaozhun ditu) now shows a ‘ten dash line’. For China’s leadership, this line represents more than just geography — it embodies the broader goal of national rejuvenation (民族复兴, minzu fuxing), a key part of the country’s political identity under Xi Jinping. This narrative reaches deep into China’s collective memory — particularly the ‘century of humiliation’ (百年屈辱, bainian quru), when foreign powers imposed unequal treaties, seized territory, and challenged Chinese sovereignty. Reclaiming control over disputed maritime spaces is seen within this framework as a moral and historical mission — restoring China’s dignity and reasserting its rightful role on the global stage.
For the current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, ceding ground in the SCS would therefore carry symbolic and political costs far beyond territorial loss. It would be interpreted domestically as a failure to defend national sovereignty and a setback to the vision of restoring China as a strong, respected, and technologically advanced great power. Internationally, such a concession could weaken China’s influence over regional norms and maritime governance, undermining its broader strategic ambitions. In this sense, the SCS is not only a site of material competition over resources and strategic chokepoints, but also a symbolic arena where the narrative of national rejuvenation is actively constructed and defended.
China’s capacity to project power on land is inherently constrained by geography, logistics, and the risk of direct confrontation with well-armed neighbours or entrenched alliances. In contrast, maritime spaces — particularly the SCS — offer Beijing greater leeway to assert influence without triggering large-scale, high-cost conflicts. Unlike a land invasion, maritime assertiveness allows China to leverage a mix of naval patrols, artificial islands, coast guard operations, and maritime militia to gradually shape control over disputed areas. This lower-risk, incremental approach enables Beijing to advance strategic objectives, reinforce sovereignty claims, and gain access to critical sea lanes and resources, all while avoiding the operational and political costs associated with territorial expansion on land. Consequently, China’s strategic focus is likely to remain centred on maritime assertiveness rather than land-based conquest, with the SCS serving as the primary arena for testing, projecting, and consolidating its growing regional influence.
From China’s own vantage point, it is under pressure. Beijing argues that external powers — chiefly the U.S. — are encroaching on its security perimeter, threatening critical sea lines of communication (SLOC, 海上交通线, haishang jiaotongxian), and seeking to contain its rise. In its telling, its maritime buildup is defensive, a way to protect its sovereignty, resources, and growing footprint in the area and the wider Indo-Pacific region (IPR).
The sea is also economically indispensable. Beneath its surface lie believed deposits of all 17 REEs, plus yttrium and scandium — minerals central to modern technology, defence, and green energy. They power everything from smartphones and batteries to precision missiles, radar, jet engines, wind turbines, and electric motors. China’s control of these resources helps sustain its high-tech manufacturing base, its renewable energy ambitions, and the modernisation of its military (军事现代化, junshi xiandaihua) — making the SCS not just politically important, but economically and technologically vital, especially as technological competition between the U.S., China, and other regional and global actors has intensified exponentially in recent years.
These same REEs are also indispensable to China’s rapidly expanding space programme — enabling satellite production, launch vehicle manufacturing, and advanced propulsion systems — thereby reinforcing its broader great-power aspirations and accelerating its rise as a comprehensive space and technology power. China’s space achievements are central to its self-image as a rejuvenated major power, showcasing technological self-reliance and placing it in direct competition with other leading spacefaring states. They also draw on deep cultural and mythological symbolism, with missions named after figures such as Chang’e (嫦娥嫦娥, chang’e), Yutu (玉兔, yutu), Zhurong (祝融, zhyrong), and the Tiangong (天宫, tiangong) ‘Heavenly Palace’, linking modern aerospace mastery with ancient cosmology and civilisational heritage. These mission names are deeply embedded in China’s collective cultural narratives, grounding the space programme in symbols that resonate within cultural memory.
This fusion of technological ambition and mythic narrative strengthens domestic legitimacy, fortifies China’s national pride, and projects an image of China as a civilisation rising once again — not just on Earth, but in space. Yet despite these achievements reaching beyond Earth’s orbit, Beijing’s great-power strategy remains firmly anchored in the maritime domain, where control of the SCS provides the most immediate and tangible foundation for shaping regional order.
Strategically, the SCS — including the Paracel Islands (西沙群岛, xisha qundao) and Spratly Islands (南沙群岛, nansha qundao) — provides China with immense leverage. At the same time, China’s artificial islands and forward bases give it a growing military footprint: airstrips, missile sites, surveillance capabilities, and hardened facilities enable both monitoring and power projection. This is part of a larger coercive effort to shape a new regional security architecture more favourable to Beijing.
Sustained Coercive Tactics
China presses its claims through a layered approach that spans legal, economic, and coercive measures. Legally, it engages in ‘lawfare’ (法律战, falü zhan), selectively accepting, reinterpreting, or rejecting international rulings to suit its strategic objectives. A clear example is Beijing’s rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration (常设仲裁法院, changshe zhongcai fayuan) ruling in favor of the Philippines, which invalidated many of its claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). At the same time, China continues to emphasise its so-called ‘historic rights’ over vast areas of the SCS, framing these claims as legitimate based on centuries of usage. Beyond formal legal arguments, Beijing uses economic leverage to shape regional positions: bilateral trade agreements, investment projects, and infrastructure financing are often used to divide or temper opposition among Southeast Asian states, discouraging a unified front against Chinese claims.
China’s maritime militia — ostensibly civilian fishing vessels coordinated with the navy and coast guard — serves as a critical tool of sustained coercion. These vessels frequently swarm reefs and shoals, shadow foreign ships, and assert presence near disputed features, creating tension without triggering open conflict. Their dual civilian/military status allows Beijing to maintain plausible deniability while effectively reinforcing its maritime claims. For instance, in 2023 and 2024, these militia boats were documented surrounding Philippine and Vietnamese vessels near the Spratly Islands, limiting access and asserting control in contested waters.
The Chinese coast guard has also taken a more assertive and reckless role, increasingly restricting access to claimed areas, confronting foreign ships, and escorting Chinese construction activities on disputed islands. These operations often operate at the limits of international law, heightening the risk of miscalculation. For example, last August 11, 2025, a maritime incident took place near Scarborough Shoal in the SCS, in which a China Coast Guard vessel and a People’s Liberation Army Navy warship collided while aggressively pursuing a Philippine Coast Guard patrol vessel resulting in possible casualties among Chinese Coast Guard personnel. Administratively, China has further embedded its claims through domestic governance structures. Sansha City (三沙市, sansha shi), established on Woody Island (永兴岛, yongxing dao) and overseeing multiple disputed features, functions as a municipal authority that integrates civilian administration with military oversight, providing a permanent framework to assert control and consolidate Chinese sovereignty over contested areas.
On the narrative front, China actively manages perceptions through coercive cognitive warfare, a persistent campaign of online disinformation and false narratives. State media, academic research, and official mapping projects collectively promote the notion that China’s maritime activities are defensive, stabilising, and legitimate. For example, Chinese government publications routinely portray military exercises as routine patrols to protect fishermen or safeguard trade routes inside the Philippine’s Exclusive Economic Zone, thus, violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Chinese state media frames these overtly coercive manoeuvers as both reasonable and necessary. Over time, this messaging seeks to normalise China’s expanded presence in the SCS and shape both domestic and international understanding of its maritime strategy.
Militarisation and Escalation Risk
China’s artificial islands — such as Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reefs — have been extensively upgraded into fully operational military nodes. These islands now host airstrips capable of handling fighter jets, surface-to-air and anti-ship missile batteries, sophisticated radar arrays, deep-water ports for naval vessels, and hardened shelters designed to protect critical assets from attack. Beyond static infrastructure, these facilities are integrated into the broader maritime strategy through complex exercises that test coordination and readiness. Recent drills have included night-time live-fire exercises, high-speed naval manoeuvres, and helicopter deployments, simulating a full spectrum of combat scenarios. For example, in 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN, 中国人民解放军海军, zhongguorenmin jiefangjun haijun) conducted a series of combined arms exercises around Subi Reef, involving fast-attack craft, fighter jets, and missile launches, demonstrating its ability to rapidly mobilise and defend these outposts.
Layered on top of these developments is a highly sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) (反介入/区域拒止, fan jieru / quyu juzhi) architecture. Long-range missile systems such as the Dongfeng 21 (DF-21, 东风-21, dongfeng-21) and DF-26 (东风-26, dongfeng-26) ‘carrier-killer’ missiles, advanced coastal radar installations, and integrated command-and-control networks are designed to detect, track, and target potential intruders, effectively deterring other powers from operating freely in contested waters. These systems are increasingly networked with surveillance assets on nearby islands and mainland facilities, creating overlapping coverage zones that extend China’s operational reach across large portions of the SCS. For instance, the combination of radar on Fiery Cross Reef and missile batteries on Subi Reef (渚碧礁, zhubi jiao) allows China to monitor and, if necessary, threaten vessels hundreds of kilometers away, complicating the planning of U.S. and allied naval operations.
These militarisation efforts heighten the risk of miscalculation and accidental escalation. Close encounters have become increasingly frequent, ranging from ship-to-ship confrontations and water-cannon incidents to aggressive aerial intercepts near disputed features. In 2023, U.S. Navy aircraft conducting freedom-of-navigation operations (FONOPs, 航行自由行动, hangxing ziyou xingdong) were shadowed and occasionally challenged by Chinese fighter jets, prompting heightened alert levels. China interprets these U.S. and allied operations — including carrier deployments, increased basing, and multinational naval exercises — as provocations to its sovereignty, fueling a cycle of action and reaction that could escalate rapidly if mismanaged. The dense concentration of military assets, combined with overlapping claims and high-tempo operations, creates a persistent risk that a localised incident could spiral into a broader confrontation.
Escalation Beyond the SCS
China’s maritime assertiveness is not confined to the SCS; it extends into the East China Sea (ECS, 东海, dong hai), the South Pacific, and other strategic maritime corridors. In the ECS, Chinese naval and coast guard operations around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have intensified in recent years, reflecting Beijing’s broader strategy to assert claims over disputed maritime features and airspace. For example, in 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels conducted multiple patrols within Japan’s claimed territorial waters, accompanied by PLAN frigates and surveillance aircraft. These manoeuvers coincided with Japan’s own military modernisation and increased aerial patrols, creating an environment of heightened tension and repeated near-miss incidents between Chinese and Japanese forces.
In the South Pacific, China has steadily expanded its presence through both military and dual-use infrastructure, including port access and logistical facilities in nations such as Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. These deployments suggest Beijing is seeking to extend its strategic reach beyond traditional ‘near seas’, providing forward-operating options for the PLAN and creating potential nodes for surveillance and rapid response. For instance, the 2023 security pact between China and the Solomon Islands opened the door for Chinese personnel and equipment to operate from Honiara, raising concerns in Canberra and Washington about a potential military foothold in a previously U.S.-aligned region.
The broader pattern includes frequent long-range deployments of Chinese naval vessels — including destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport ships — into the Pacific and Indian Oceans, often shadowing U.S. carrier strike groups or joining joint exercises with regional partners. These actions are accompanied by a robust presence of maritime militia (海上民兵, haishang minbing) and coast guard units, enabling Beijing to signal capability and resolve without crossing conventional warfighting thresholds. For example, in early 2025, a Chinese amphibious landing ship conducted exercises near Papua New Guinea while U.S. and Australian forces monitored the operation from nearby waters.
Collectively, these deployments illustrate a multi-theater approach to maritime competition. They allow China to project power, influence regional calculations, and gather intelligence across strategic chokepoints and trade routes. At the same time, they elevate the potential for miscalculation: close encounters with U.S., Japanese, and Australian vessels, as well as the presence of civilian-military dual-use forces, increase the likelihood of incidents that could escalate beyond the local level. In short, China’s activities beyond the SCS reflect both ambition and reckless behaviour — signaling power, testing responses, and shaping the regional order while implementing grey zone operations against other claimants of the SCS.
U.S.–China Strategic Competition in the Region
U.S. naval strategy in the Indo-Pacific remains focused on deterrence, forward presence, and operational readiness. A clear demonstration of this posture is the continuous U.S. carrier presence in the South China Sea. In November 2025, the USS George Washington entered the SCS just as the USS Nimitz departed, ensuring uninterrupted coverage amid heightened Chinese and allied activity around Scarborough Shoal (Philippines). The Nimitz strike group had just completed trilateral exercises with Japan and the Philippines — including the Japanese destroyer JS Akebono and Philippine Navy ships BRP Jose Rizal and BRP Antonio Luna — designed to enhance interoperability, joint operations, and maritime domain awareness. These drills prompted Chinese protests and bomber overflights, highlighting the ongoing tensions and the symbolic stakes of maritime presence.
The USS Nimitz Carrier Strike Group has conducted high-tempo flight operations in the SCS, including day and night evolutions, maritime strike drills, and coordinated surface-to-air training. Similarly, the USS Carl Vinson, operating alongside other U.S. Navy assets, has conducted joint exercises with regional partners, underscoring the U.S. willingness to actively counter China’s maritime militarisation while reassuring allies and partners of extended deterrence. These deployments are increasingly complemented by aerial reconnaissance, submarine patrols, and joint exercises with Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, illustrating the U.S. integrated approach to managing strategic competition across multiple domains.
The U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific is not purely military; it also encompasses capacity-building, intelligence-sharing, and multilateral training initiatives aimed at strengthening regional resilience. Programmes such as the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises — the world’s largest international maritime exercise — enable U.S. forces and regional partners to conduct joint operations, refine command-and-control procedures, and enhance interoperability across naval, air, and amphibious forces. Beyond RIMPAC, the U.S. engages in maritime domain awareness initiatives, including joint surveillance, information-sharing networks, and coordination on search-and-rescue or anti-piracy operations. These efforts enable smaller regional navies to better monitor contested waters, respond to emergencies, and maintain credible deterrence against coercive actions by China.
At the same time, these activities serve as visible demonstrations of U.S. commitment and strategic resolve, reassuring allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and Australia that Washington is prepared to uphold freedom of navigation, defend regional norms, and respond to potential crises in the Indo-Pacific. By maintaining both a persistent physical presence and extensive capacity-building initiatives, the U.S. positions itself to counter China’s maritime assertiveness while shaping regional security dynamics on multiple fronts, raising the stakes for other Indo-Pacific actors, including Japan, India, Australia, ASEAN member states, and external powers with strategic interests in the region.
The Philippines and Regional Responses
The Philippines remains a frontline state in the maritime contest, adeptly balancing (平衡, pingheng) its geographic proximity to China with its iron-clad security alliance with the U.S., Japan, Australia, India and the European Union (EU). This balancing act reflects Manila’s recognition that it faces both immediate territorial pressures from Beijing and broader regional security dynamics involving major powers. In January 2025, the Philippines and the U.S. conducted their first joint patrol of the year, involving the USS Carl Vinson and Philippine Navy vessels. These operations served multiple purposes: they demonstrate U.S. commitment to regional security, reinforce deterrence against coercive Chinese actions, and allow the Philippines to assert sovereignty over contested areas such as the West Philippine Sea (西菲律宾海, xifeilübin hai). Joint training, coordinated maritime surveillance, and combined naval manoeuvers enhance the operational capabilities of the Philippine Navy, enabling it to better respond to incursions, monitor disputed features, and maintain credible presence in strategically important waters.
Beyond military collaboration, as the ASEAN Chair for 2026, the Philippines will take the lead for the drafting of the Code of Conduct (行为准则, xingwei zhunze) in the SCS. This drafting of the Code of Conduct has been persistently delayed. Thus, the Philippines pursues a multi-layered strategy that blends diplomacy, international law, and regional engagement. Manila has been active in multilateral forums, including ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, leveraging legal mechanisms such as the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling to assert its maritime claims. These diplomatic efforts are complemented by enhanced maritime domain awareness through partnerships with the U.S., Japan, and Australia, including satellite surveillance, intelligence-sharing, and joint exercises focused on safeguarding critical sea lanes.
China’s renaming of islands and maritime features has become a central tool in its broader territorial strategy. By systematically assigning Chinese names to reefs and shoals, Beijing embeds its claims symbolically and administratively, reinforcing a narrative of historical legitimacy and permanent control. This ‘naming power’ acts as a low-cost, high-impact method of influence, asserting sovereignty without overt military confrontation. When combined with militarisation of islands, coast guard operations, and the deployment of maritime militia, these symbolic measures create a layered and persistent challenge for the Philippines and other SCS countries. Manila must therefore coordinate diplomacy, alliances, and operational readiness, balancing assertiveness with caution to defend its claims while avoiding escalation in a densely militarised environment.
ASEAN Dynamics and Regional Complexity
ASEAN have responded to China’s maritime assertiveness in diverse ways, reflecting differences in geography, security dependence, and economic interconnection. Middle powers like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam often hedge — engaging economically with China while simultaneously maintaining security ties with the U.S. and other partners. Indonesia, for instance, practices ‘flexible hedging’, leveraging Chinese investment opportunities while strengthening its own naval and maritime capabilities to safeguard sovereignty. Vietnam employs a nuanced ‘four Bs’ approach — broadening partnerships, binding institutions, building deterrent capabilities, and blunting Chinese assertiveness — to navigate contested waters in the Spratly Islands (南沙群岛, nansha qundao).
Balancing is particularly evident in the Philippines, which relies on U.S. security guarantees, joint patrols, intelligence-sharing, and training exercises. The long-standing U.S.-Philippines alliance, one of America’s oldest in the Global South, underpins this relationship. This posture supports Manila in countering Chinese pressure without fully decoupling from regional economic engagement. By contrast, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar demonstrate bandwagoning behaviour, aligning with China politically and economically to benefit from investment, aid, and diplomatic support while avoiding confrontation.
Beyond individual strategies, ASEAN also engages in institutional hedging. By embedding China within multilateral frameworks such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and ongoing discussions on an ASEAN–China Code of Conduct (COC), the bloc collectively seeks to manage risk, shape regional norms, and preserve its autonomy. The ASEAN–China COC aims to provide clear guidelines for stability in the South China Sea, though progress has been slow. Its origins lie in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC), a non-binding agreement in which ASEAN members and China committed to working toward a formal code. Formal negotiations began in 2018, but strategic uncertainties and regional power disparities have slowed the process. Under the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship, there is a plan to finalise the COC by 2026, though some experts question whether this timeline is realistic. This approach allows member states to manage tensions without forcing a binary choice, demonstrating ASEAN’s agency in navigating the complex interplay of coercion, cooperation, and great-power rivalry.
China–Regional Cooperation
Despite its coercive measures, China continues to engage regionally in ways that extend beyond military or territorial pressure. Joint fisheries management with ASEAN states, for instance, provides a platform for regulatory cooperation, dispute resolution, and confidence-building, helping to prevent low-level conflicts in contested waters. Infrastructure investments — including ports such as Gwadar in Pakistan and Piraeus in Greece, transport corridors like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, 中巴经济走廊, zhongba jingji zoulang) and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor (中印孟缅经济走廊, zhongyin mengmian jingji zoulang), and energy projects including hydropower plants in Laos — such as the Nam Tha 1 hydropower plant built by China Southern Power Grid, the Nam Ou River Cascade Hydropower Project developed by PowerChina, and the ‘Southern Mekong cascade’ (南欧江流域梯级水电站, nanoujiang liuyu tiji shuidianzhan) multi-staged hydropower development projects — as well as oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, 一带一路倡议, yidaiyilu changyi) — deepen economic interdependence, create long-term strategic footholds, and generate domestic political support among recipient states.
Even in humanitarian contexts, such as disaster relief following typhoons or public health emergencies, China demonstrates capacity for soft-power influence, enhancing its regional image and fostering goodwill. For example, after Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013), China provided emergency aid including food, medical supplies, and reconstruction support. In public health, China has deployed medical teams and donated vaccines to countries in Southeast Asia during the COVID-19 pandemic, including Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. It has also supported regional disease surveillance and training through initiatives such as the China-ASEAN Public Health Cooperation (中国东盟公共卫生合作, zhongguo dongmeng gonggong weisheng hezuo) framework. Together, these initiatives construct a dual image of China: a coercive actor asserting and consolidating maritime claims, and a cooperative partner delivering economic and humanitarian benefits. This duality complicates regional decision-making, as states must constantly balance the risks of coercion against the tangible incentives of engagement, navigating a landscape where economic opportunity, security concerns, and diplomatic pressures intersect.
Broader Implications for Regional and Global Security
China’s maritime rise presents multi-dimensional challenges that go beyond conventional military competition. Its use of grey-zone tactics (灰色地带战术, huīsè dìdài zhànshù) — including maritime militia operations, coast guard harassment, and coercive economic measures, among others — allows Beijing to assert influence incrementally, often without crossing thresholds that would trigger direct conflict. At the same time, China leverages selective legal interpretation, selectively accepting, rejecting, or reinterpreting international rulings to reinforce claims while avoiding full compliance with international law. This approach, combined with a rapidly modernising military, including advanced missile systems, integrated A2/AD networks, and forward-deployed naval assets, erodes traditional deterrence frameworks and undermines established norms of maritime conduct in contested waters.
China’s control over strategically critical resources — including REEs essential for high-tech industries and green energy technologies — as well as forward-operating bases and key SLOC, provides it with both economic and technological leverage. These capabilities enable Beijing to project power across military and civilian domains, influence regional decision-making, and enhance self-sufficiency in critical industries, from advanced manufacturing to defence systems and renewable energy infrastructure. By controlling both the physical and economic levers of maritime influence, China positions itself to shape regional security dynamics on multiple fronts, raising the stakes for other Indo-Pacific actors, including Japan, India, Australia, ASEAN member states, and external powers with strategic interests in the region.
The U.S. and its regional partners respond with a multifaceted strategy that blends forward presence, alliance reinforcement, and capacity-building programmes. U.S. naval deployments, FONOPs, joint exercises, and intelligence-sharing partnerships signal resolve while enhancing regional preparedness. At the same time, allies and partners invest in technological modernisation, cybersecurity cooperation, and maritime domain awareness initiatives to counterbalance China’s growing capabilities. However, the rivalry is not limited to the military domain; it encompasses economic competition, technological innovation, and normative influence, with multiple states — including Japan, Australia, India, and ASEAN members — navigating overlapping security, trade, and diplomatic considerations.
For regional actors, the strategic calculus is increasingly complex. Countries simultaneously pursue strategic hedging, balancing, and selective engagement to preserve autonomy, safeguard sovereignty, and maximise national interests in a fluid, high-stakes security environment. Hedging may involve strengthening economic ties with China while deepening security cooperation with the U.S.; balancing could include enhancing military capabilities or joining multilateral security frameworks; selective engagement allows states to cooperate on non-contentious issues such as disaster relief, infrastructure, or fisheries management. The ability of regional actors — individually and collectively — to manage competition without escalating conflict will shape the Indo-Pacific’s strategic architecture for decades to come, determining whether the region can sustain stability, preserve freedom of navigation, and maintain a rules-based order amid intensifying great-power rivalry.
Conclusion
China’s maritime assertiveness — from increasingly complex drills in the SCS to expanded operations in the ECS and South Pacific — reflects a multi-dimensional strategy aimed at securing resources, projecting power, and reshaping regional dynamics. Beijing combines coercive operations, administrative consolidation, symbolic measures such as renaming islands, and selective engagement through cooperative initiatives like fisheries management, infrastructure investment, and disaster relief. Together, these actions reinforce control, influence perceptions, and expand strategic reach across military, economic, and technological domains.
Regional states respond with a spectrum of strategies that illustrate the complexity of Indo-Pacific security. Strategic hedging, balancing, and bandwagoning highlight ASEAN’s nuanced approaches to managing China’s rise. The Philippines, as a frontline state, exemplifies balancing through U.S. military cooperation, while other states navigate competing pressures by maintaining autonomy, pursuing selective engagement, or aligning economically and politically with Beijing.
The SCS therefore functions as both a maritime flashpoint and a lens into the broader dynamics of Indo-Pacific rivalry. The key challenge for regional and global actors is managing competition without triggering conflict, while ensuring institutions, alliances, and diplomacy keep pace with rapidly evolving threats and opportunities. How these dynamics are navigated will shape the security architecture of Southeast Asia and influence the strategic equilibrium of the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.
About the authors:
- Scott N. Romaniuk: Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
- Amparo Pamela Fabe: Professor of the National Police College, Philippines. She is a Fellow of the Brute Krulak Center of the US Marine Corps University and a Maritime Security Fellow of the Maritime Research Center in Pune, India where she specialises in Geopolitics, Underwater Domain Awareness and Engagement with Ocean Dependent Communities.
- László Csicsmann: Full Professor and Head of the Centre for Contemporary Asia Studies, Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary; Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA)
- Junzhi Song (宋浚枝): Researcher, University of British Columbia, Canada
About the Author
