The Philippines is fighting a tough battle against Chinese Coast Guard intrusions into its own EEZ. During ASEAN meetings, the Chinese relented and reduced the intensity of the restrictions on Filipino ships without withdrawing from the area.
Thus, during the recent ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting accompanied by meetings of foreign ministers at the ARF, the EAS, and the China-ASEAN meeting, it seemed like an order of a ceasefire by the Chinese against Filipino efforts to replenish their small contingent stranded on a grounded ship at the Second Thomas Shoal.
No sooner are these meetings over that Chinese efforts to restrict the movement of Filipino ships and assault them with non-lethal weapons recur.
Such Chinese aggression and ASEAN’s relative silence make the Philippines feel isolated. Consequently, the Philippines is seeking ASEAN Plus solutions by closely aligning itself with the Quad countries, the US, Japan, Australia, and India, though not as a Quad but individually so.
When negotiations began in 2002, ASEAN and China had a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS. That declaration was meant to be a precursor to the COC but has remained the only declaration to date.
A recent commentary quotes Japanese Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi of Aoyama Gakuin University as saying, ‘the Asean-China talks on the code of conduct have become a forum for mutual complacency, where both sides can pretend that progress is possible.’ Sharon Sheah of ISEAS adds that the negotiations’ delay was caused by disagreements over the COC’s enforceability, geographical scope, and activities it would proscribe.
Before the pandemic, ASEAN achieved some understanding with China on the preamble to the COC. Up to 2017, China did not wish to discuss this with ASEAN because they felt that problems in the South China Sea were with individual ASEAN countries and needed to be settled bilaterally.
Vietnam and the Philippines were in the front zone, while Brunei and Malaysia adopted a quieter, non-confrontational view. Indonesia, which did not have a territorial dispute under the 9-dash line, found itself the victim of Chinese intrusions into its EEZ off the Natuna Sea, thus bringing it into the matrix as well.
In September 2023, ASEAN Leaders again expressed concern with ‘the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities’ in the SCS.
They welcomed the ‘completion of the second reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text and the adoption of the Guidelines for Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.’
However, they stepped beyond the SCS and spoke about ‘the need to maintain and further strengthen stability in the maritime sphere in our region, underlined the importance of strengthening maritime cooperation, and recognized the need to explore new initiatives towards these ends.’
This is an effort to better coordinate ASEAN on its issues of maritime cooperation and security. If this succeeds, then perhaps ASEAN would have a better negotiating strategy with China. Now, it appears that ASEAN countries, even those that are landlocked, are taking a more active role in engaging among themselves to work out norms under which ASEAN member states can associate with each other regarding maritime matters.
However, in this effort, some countries have a Chinese chip on their shoulder and want to negotiate internal positions while considering what China prefers. This constrains ASEAN at the current phase.
