Chinese vessels are transmitting fake signals in Taiwan’s waters as a form of cognitive warfare, testing Taiwan’s responses to various types of incursions, a report by the Institute for the Study of War said on Friday last week.

Several Chinese fishing vessels transmitted fake automatic identification system (AIS) signals in Taiwan’s waters last month, with one mimicking a Russian warship and another impersonating a Chinese law enforcement vessel, the report said.

The report cited data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence that throughout August and last month, the Chinese fishing boat Min Shi Yu 06718 (閩獅漁06718) sailed through the Taiwan Strait while intermittently transmitting its own AIS and the AIS of a ship called Hai Xun 15012 (海巡15012).

A Chinese fishing boat is pictured in an undated photograph.

Photo courtesy of a reader

Hai Xun ships are normally operated by the China Maritime Safety Administration (CMSA), a civilian law enforcement agency that has not been significantly involved in Chinese coercion against Taiwan, the report said.

This makes it likely that it was a fishing vessel posing as a CMSA vessel, rather than the other way around, it said.

On Sept. 17, another fishing boat, Min Shi Yu 07792 (閩獅漁07792), transmitted a fake signal of Russian Warship 532 in Taiwan’s northern exclusive economic zone, it said.

The report went on to explain that several other Min Shi Yu vessels also transmitted fake AIS signals around the same time and area, with one posing as a tugboat and another as a different fishing boat.

China is experimenting with AIS spoofing to “pollute Taiwan’s information environment and test Taiwan’s responses to different kinds of perceived incursions,” the report said.

The fact that multiple fishing vessels with similar names transmitted different fake signals around the same time and place suggests a coordinated effort, it said.

These fishing boats likely belong to the Chinese Maritime Militia, which China often deploys to “carry out deniable ‘gray zone’ coercion, harassment and surveillance” in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, it added.

In addition, Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered restricted waters around Kinmen County four times from Sept. 15 to 17.

While the overall frequency of three to four incursions per month has remained steady, the increasing concentration over short periods represents a new pattern, the report said.

In terms of airspace incursions, Chinese sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) have surpassed 300 per month for eight continuous months, more than double the monthly average before President William Lai (賴清德) took office in May last year.

China has “likely normalized a higher frequency of ADIZ incursions to degrade Taiwan’s threat awareness and response threshold, and to probe response protocols,” the report said.

China’s increasingly routine incursions into Taiwan’s ADIZ have raised the bar for what constitutes a coercive act, “making it more difficult for Taiwan to detect and respond to a real threat effectively,” it said.

Maintaining readiness for these frequent incursions also places heavy demands on Taiwan’s resources and personnel, it added.