In early October, Indonesian defence minister Prabowo Subianto will be inaugurated as the country’s 8th president. Unlike outgoing president Joko Widodo (Jokowi), whose administration was primarily focused on domestic development, Prabowo is keen to bolster Indonesia’s military capabilities and geopolitical footprint. He is expected to be an ‘orthodox innovator’, seeking to make gradual adjustments while deepening and expanding partnerships.
One of Prabowo’s key priorities will be bolstering Indonesia’s military strength. In recent months, he has argued that a country’s prosperity is closely linked to its security, and Indonesia needs a strong and capable military to protect its interests. Over the past decade, Indonesia has consistently underfunded its defence sector, with spending stuck below 1 percent of GDP. The majority of Indonesia’s defence budget is consumed by operational costs, with only about 25 percent earmarked for capital expenditures, such as modernising military equipment.
Prabowo plans to significantly increase defence spending. The proposed state budget for 2025 reflects this commitment, with defence spending slated to rise by 22 percent, from 135 trillion rupiah (AUD$13 billion) in 2024 to 165.2 trillion rupiah (AUD$16 billion). This increase is in line with Prabowo’s campaign promise to gradually elevate Indonesia’s defence budget to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2029, effectively doubling current expenditure levels. The increased budget is expected to be directed towards enhancing naval and aerial capabilities, such as the recent deal with Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri for the procurement of two offshore patrol vessels. This decision underscores growing concern from Indonesia’s defence establishment about surface and sub-surface maritime threats.
In addition to strengthening the military, Prabowo is expected to consolidate presidential control over defence and foreign policy. During Jokowi’s administration, decision-making in these areas lacked a ‘centralised hub’, resulting in fragmented policy execution and competition between ministries and agencies. For example, Indonesia’s economic ties with China was largely managed by Luhut Pandjaitan, the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment, rather than the foreign ministry. This decentralised management style created inconsistencies in policy direction.
Prabowo is likely to reverse this trend by taking direct control of defence and foreign policy decisions, much like former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who included key foreign policy advisers, Dino Pati Djalal and Hasan Wirajuda, in the presidential palace. Prabowo is expected to rely heavily on a close circle of trusted advisers and loyalists, many of whom have personal or familial ties to him. This approach is already evident in the appointment of his nephew Thomas Djiwandono as deputy minister for finance—a move which was part of Prabowo’s strategy to place individuals with whom he shares a deep rapport in key positions. By concentrating decision-making authority in the hands of trusted allies within the Istana and in the defence and foreign ministers, Prabowo aims to ensure coherence and consistency in the administration’s defence and foreign policies.
Despite Prabowo’s more hands-on approach, Indonesia is expected to remain consistent in its foreign policy orientation. Prabowo’s recent visits to countries such as Japan, China, France, Turkey, Australia and Russia may have raised speculation about a potential shift in foreign policy orientation, but there is likely to be more continuity than change. Three core imperatives have long guided Indonesia’s foreign policy: defending territorial sovereignty, maintaining strategic ambiguity and fostering relationships with multiple powers to expand diplomatic options.
Under Jokowi, Indonesia’s foreign policy was largely shaped by economic considerations. His administration sought to diversify economic partnerships, strengthening ties with China, South Korea and the UAE while also engaging with the United States on initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Prabowo’s visits, on the other hand, reflect a shift towards strengthening defence partnerships, especially with countries such as France and Turkey. As defence minister, he procured French Rafale fighter jets and Turkish Anka drones, simultaneously strengthening and deepening defence partnerships in the process.
While Prabowo’s foreign policy will likely be more active and outward-looking, Indonesia will continue to navigate its relationships with major powers while avoiding alignment with any single bloc. This ensures that Indonesia maintains flexibility in an increasingly multipolar world. In the absence of major regional upheaval, Indonesia’s foreign policy is expected to follow a steady course, emphasising pragmatic partnerships and gradual adjustments.
Prabowo Subianto’s presidency will mark a period of enhanced focus on military modernisation, stronger presidential control over defence and foreign policy, and a more active interpretation of Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy approach.
This approach will offer Australia an opportunity to strengthen defence cooperation and highlight common interests in preserving a stable regional environment through direct engagement with the new president. Indonesia’s more multipolar orientation and ambivalence toward the US-China rivalry could generate friction in the bilateral relationship, but there is incentive on both sides to downplay differences and work together to advance mutual interests. Australia can play a constructive and valued role in this context by keeping an eye on how Prabowo’s evolving views on foreign policy are put into practice and what that will mean for the region.
