The United States’ 6 January decision to withdraw from many international organisations risks allowing Beijing and Moscow to further advance their undermining of global stability. To prevent that, Indo-Pacific partners, such as Australia, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, should do more to work with the European Union on international coordination, capacity-building and norm-setting.
Doing so would reinforce crucial institutions, such as those dealing with hybrid threats, and demonstrate their ongoing value and relevance. Greater regional responsibility may even help encourage US engagement in the most critical areas.
On the surface, President Donald Trump’s executive order on the withdrawals appears more symbolic than immediately disruptive. Many of the 66 affected entities address specific issues so are not necessarily widely known, meaning the US’s withdrawal may have little affect globally.
The danger, then, lies not in this single decision but in the cumulative effects of US disengagement over time. Indeed, Washington’s confidence in multilateral institutions had already plummeted in recent years as China and Russia expanded their grip on them. International partners, if they don’t want the US withdrawal to send the message to Beijing and Moscow that they can further expand their influence, should increase and refocus their engagement to demonstrate the value of the most crucial international bodies.
One such area is the global security architecture dealing with hybrid threats, as Russia and China are carrying out such activities at record levels.
Hybrid threats exploit ambiguity, cooperation gaps and the grey space between peace and war. Certain international organisations—particularly those focused on democratic resilience, cyber defence, counterterrorism, maritime threats and countering economic coercion—exist specifically to reduce those vulnerabilities by bolstering individual states’ capabilities, as well as enabling collective responses.
Bodies such as the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance play critical roles in identifying risks before they escalate into crises.
The US withdrawal will not shut down these organisations—as it is only a minor financial contributor to the European centre of excellence, for example—but the move does remove US expertise, intelligence reach and political weight, reducing the organisations’ influence.
And if the withdrawal signals a wider reduction of US engagement with its partners to counter such threats, it would make joint attribution harder, and deterrence increasingly difficult, leaving the world more susceptible to hybrid activity.
The withdrawal may, for example, signal a deprioritisation of norm-building and norm-adherence in particular domains—addressed by bodies such as the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combatting Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia or the Global Counterterrorism Forum. That could encourage malign actors to test the boundaries of acceptable behaviour, in the absence of clear consequences.
Situational awareness would also decline as US engagement has traditionally enhanced data collection and resources. It is therefore up to partners to ensure that Washington’s absence from multilateral bodies does not reduce information-sharing nor fragment the global threat picture, which would weaken detection and effective responses.
All those dynamics favour malign actors, most obviously Russia and China, that are inclined to exploit uncertainty. Reduced scrutiny and weaker coordination facilitate intensified disinformation operations, cyber intrusions and political interference. Hybrid campaigns are likely to become more experimental, raising the base level of coercion and normalising behaviour that would previously attract collective pushback.
As the US steps back, the burden of coordination, capacity-building and norm-setting shifts to others. The EU has already taken a prominent role raising awareness of hybrid threats. In response to Russian aggression, the EU has updated its policy settings, including by investing in cooperation mechanisms with the Indo-Pacific. One such example is HIPPA, which examines the prospects for a mechanism to address hybrid threats in this region.
As China is the primary concern when it comes to hybrid threats in the Indo-Pacific, this is an area where Australia and the EU could demonstrate value. And that doesn’t have to entail US membership, but it does require focused, practical collaboration between regional partners. Taking greater responsibility for reinforcing regional responses would both demonstrate the importance of the issue, as well as alleviate long-held US concerns of burden-sharing.
That’s also why regional partners such as Australia, Japan, Singapore and South Korea should step up. Indeed, Southeast Asia, the Pacific and specific partners such as the Philippines and Taiwan are already experiencing sustained maritime pressure, information operations and diplomatic coercion. A stronger Indo-Pacific hybrid-threats capability would serve global security and stability.
By focusing on reinforcement and reform of crucial bodies, Australia and its regional and international partners can weather Washington’s withdrawal. But they need practical cooperation in these vital fields to narrow the space for malign actors to exploit uncertainty and disunity. Doing so may even go some way towards rebuilding US confidence in collective action and security.
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