The Quad is hobbled in its current configuration as a diplomatic partnership that deliberately eschews defence cooperation as part of its agenda. It’s time to test the waters with a meeting of Quad defence ministers.
While the navies of the four Quad members—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—hold regular joint training in a quadrilateral format through the annual Exercise Malabar, officially these drills are separate to the Quad. That is despite the fact that Malabar is described by participating countries much as they describe the Quad, as part of a ‘shared commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific’.
It is increasingly awkward, if not absurd, to insist, as Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade does, that the Quad ‘is a diplomatic, not security, partnership’ but at the same time focuses on maritime security, cyber security and health security.
Some analysts maintain that the Quad’s quiescence stems from India’s ‘differing world view’ and limited strategic appetite. This assumption should be tested. The headquarters of India’s defence staff said on 9 October that the latest Exercise Malabar was an example of ‘interoperability between navies of Quad nations’. So much for Indian reticence about describing Malabar as a Quad activity.
Japan’s political willingness to explore defence cooperation through the Quad is also worth re-examining in light of former defence minister Ishiba Shigeru’s rise to the prime ministership and his reported interest in strengthening Asia’s multilateral defence structures. While an Asian NATO might be out of sight, a Quad that does defence is perfectly realisable.
The other argument commonly heard for keeping defence out of the Quad is that Southeast Asian countries are presumed to be neuralgically opposed to any expansion of its activities into the military realm. This may apply to the more cautiously non-aligned members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but certainly not all of them. Again, this is an assumption that deserves to be tested. And deference to ASEAN’s widely assumed skittishness about the Quad is not a sufficiently weighty reason to prevent the members from legitimately discussing defence issues with each other. This is especially so at a time when the deteriorating strategic situation in the Indo-Pacific demands closer collaboration among likeminded countries with meaningful defence capabilities.
Diplomats from the Quad countries reflexively defer to the centrality of ASEAN. But a strategic vacuum at the core of this vaunted centrality was laid bare by failure at ASEAN’s summit this month to make meaningful progress on South China Sea disputes and by the inability of the associated East Asia Summit to yield even a leaders’ statement. If Quad countries wish to maintain regional stability, they will need to do more of the hard-power lifting themselves.
One suggestion for testing the waters for defence cooperation within the Quad is for the defence ministers to meet on the sidelines of a regional security summit. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), to be held in Laos in late November 2024, presents a timely opportunity. The ADMM-Plus agenda should be conducive, since it is restricted to non-warlike activities, such as maritime security and military medicine. It can provide an uncontroversial foundation that Quad defence cooperation could build on while staying within the diplomatic edifice of providing public goods for the Indo-Pacific region.
The fact that the ADMM-Plus is an ASEAN-hosted gathering presents some diplomatic sensitivity: ASEAN would not want to set such a precedent for other impromptu sideline meetings. But this sensitivity can be mitigated by hosting the meeting discreetly within one of the Quad embassies.
The 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue also presents a follow-up meeting opportunity. Since it is not institutionally tied to ASEAN, Quad defence ministers have less reason to be discreet and should publicise any meeting they hold on that occasion.
Eventually, the Quad should aim for a formal defence ministers meeting, not just to restore a much-needed component to discussions about regional trends but to generate a concrete policy agenda beyond holding quadrilateral military exercises.
