If BRICS can assemble an economic and political coalition with strategic intent, why shouldn’t the Commonwealth countries? This is the hard question Australia and its allies should be asking themselves, as existing institutions fail to protect their interests and states look to build new partnerships.
At the 2025 World Economic Forum, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that the rules-based order no longer guaranteed predictability. Institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations are struggling to constrain major power rivalry as resource security, industrial policy and supply-chain resilience increasingly define statecraft. Middle powers are being forced to form coalitions that reduce vulnerability.
BRICS offers a case study in strategic pragmatism. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and other countries in the bloc share few political values and operate under divergent economic systems. But they see leverage in numbers in seeking autonomy and influence. They build development banks, settlement mechanisms and political signalling platforms to hedge against Western dominance.
Australia should observe that development without alarmism. BRICS represents institutional entrepreneurship, not ideological unity. Members seek insulation from coercion and greater control over finance, trade and technology. This resonates well beyond the Global South.
The Commonwealth should join this conversation. Viewed as a ceremonial association with ties to imperial history, the Commonwealth is criticised for uneven enforcement of democratic norms and symbolic rather than operational focus. Member states suffered subordination within an empire.
Reform must therefore precede ambition. Governance rules need strengthening and membership standards need clarity. Economic coordination needs a sharper focus and leaders should consider whether the name itself obscures modern intent.
The geography and economics of the 56 Commonwealth countries demonstrate diversity and opportunity. The bloc spans every major ocean basin and includes advanced industrial economies, rapidly growing emerging markets and strategically located island states. Several countries with no British imperial history, such as Togo and Gabon, have joined for access and leverage.
Trade patterns reinforce this opportunity. Intra-Commonwealth trade exceeds external trade and operates at lower transaction costs due to shared legal and linguistic systems. Use of the common law reduces contractual friction, and business networks already operate across these corridors.
Together, Commonwealth countries have capabilities to form a credible critical-minerals coalition. Australia and Canada are two of the world’s leading producers of lithium and other battery minerals. African members control substantial reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite and rare-earth elements. India brings scale in manufacturing and technology services. Britain offers capital markets and financial expertise.
Food security amplifies that leverage. Australia and Canada produce agricultural surpluses that feed tens of millions beyond their borders, while several African and South Asian members remain net importers vulnerable to price shocks. Structured supply guarantees within a trusted grouping would reduce exposure to external coercion. In a fragmented world, a bloc that can simultaneously secure critical-mineral supply chains and guarantee grain and fertiliser corridors holds immense strategic leverage.
Maritime geography strengthens this argument. Commonwealth members sit astride the Strait of Malacca, the approaches to the Suez Canal, the Cape sea route and critical Pacific sea lanes. Port access, refuelling rights and logistics interoperability could build resilience. Naval cooperation need not mirror formal alliances; reciprocal access arrangements alone would enhance deterrence and disaster response capacity.
As for practical architecture, leaders could establish a Strategic Resource Framework that aligned investment screening, coordinated export controls and mobilised blended finance for mining and processing projects across trusted jurisdictions. Development finance institutions and private capital would require clear rules and risk-sharing mechanisms.
Maritime cooperation could take shape through a logistics and access agreement among willing members. Standardised procedures for docking, maintenance and resupply would extend operational reach without large, permanent basing footprints. Existing defence relationships, including the Five Power Defence Arrangements, demonstrate that flexible, non-treaty formats can endure.
Legal architecture represents another comparative advantage. Shared common-law traditions provide a platform for transparent dispute resolution. A specialised investment and infrastructure arbitration panel tailored to strategic sectors such as energy transition, minerals and agrifood supply chains would lower sovereign risk premiums.
India should lead reform efforts as it pursues strategic autonomy and resists alignment under Western-led umbrellas. A reformed Commonwealth would not demand ideological conformity but offer structured cooperation on supply chains, standards and connectivity. India would gain diversified access to resources while retaining diplomatic flexibility.
Reform depends on political will. The Commonwealth’s members should decide whether they view it as a historical artefact or a strategic asset. They need to be candid about past failures and clear about future objectives. They need to prioritise economic security and resilience over short-term efficiency.
BRICS shows that institutional imagination shapes influence and that states feeling underserved by existing systems can build new ones. Commonwealth leaders should follow its example and repurpose their own bloc for strategic coordination in food, minerals, finance and maritime access.
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