The responses of key U.S. allies – Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – to Washington’s maritime capability-commitment gap reflect the future of Indo-Pacific security.
The United States faces a dangerous strategic contradiction in the Indo-Pacific: expanding security commitments alongside eroding capacity to fulfill them. At the heart of this contradiction lies what can best be described as a “capability-commitment gap.” While the United States has strengthened security pledges to Indo-Pacific partners, its capacity to sustain this posture has deteriorated to crisis levels.
U.S. shipbuilding capacity now represents just 0.1 percent of global market share, while China commands 46.6 percent, creating a staggering disparity in the ability to sustain naval power in any prolonged confrontation. This represents a form of hollow maritime power – outwardly impressive but internally weakened in capabilities that translate hardware into strategic effect.
This gap has not gone unnoticed by regional actors facing daily Chinese gray zone operations. Rather than simply lamenting the United States’ decline, they are constructing new security arrangements and reimagining their roles in a regional order no longer dominated by a single maritime hegemon. The result is not a simple fracturing of the U.S. hub-and-spoke alliance system but the emergence of a “latticework” of interlocking security relationships with distributed responsibilities.
The responses of key U.S. allies – Japan, Australia, and the Philippines – to Washington’s maritime capability-commitment gap reveal significant insights about the future of Indo-Pacific security. While the gap presents grave risks, it has also catalyzed a more networked security architecture that may prove more sustainable than the system it is replacing. Whether this emerging framework can effectively deter Chinese aggression remains an open question. Still, its development represents the most significant restructuring of regional security arrangements since the end of the Cold War.
The Scale of Maritime Decline
Understanding the full implications of the U.S. capability-commitment gap in the Indo-Pacific requires grasping the unprecedented scale of its maritime industrial decline. According to a U.S. Navy estimate, “China has 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States.” This disparity is not merely academic; it will translate directly into strategic consequences in any prolonged conflict scenario. Maritime power is uniquely dependent on industrial capacity. Unlike land warfare, where armies can retreat to regroup, naval defeats often result in the permanent loss of complex vessels that take years to replace.
Technological superiority alone cannot offset industrial capacity disadvantages in maritime competition. Even advanced vessels require replacement when damaged or destroyed, a reality that China’s industrial advantage directly addresses. Hull count matters in sustained operations. China’s ability to replenish losses at 230 times the U.S. rate creates an unsustainable asymmetry in any prolonged conflict. Moreover, China has significantly narrowed technological gaps in key domains like anti-ship missiles and undersea capabilities, while simultaneously maintaining overwhelming production capacity, combining quantity with increasingly comparable quality.
The reasons for this decline are many and trace their roots to the post-Cold War period where globalization and defense centralization eliminated the American construction industry and its infrastructure. In the meantime, the United States is in a dangerous intermediate stage where its strategic ambitions are progressively outstripping its ability to meet them.
The implications on Indo-Pacific security are really significant. In the past, U.S. naval supremacy provided comfort to friends as well as a deterrent against aggression. The foundation for this is deteriorating now as regional conflicts increase. This gap for deterrence that is protracted possibly the most concerning. In general, U.S. security pledges are believable based on the intent as well as capabilities. Though the issue of political will is debateable, the concept of capability has obvious physical limitations.
Japan’s response to the United States’ maritime decline represents perhaps the most extensive strategic shift in Northeast Asia since World War II. Once constrained by its pacifist constitution and content under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan is now undertaking a comprehensive recalibration of its defense posture.
After decades of maintaining military expenditures below 1 percent of GDP, Japan has committed to raising its defense budget to 2 percent by 2027. More significant is how these funds are being allocated – Japan is systematically developing capabilities that complement declining U.S. maritime power, including anti-ship missiles, maritime patrol aircraft, and submarine capabilities. Notably, Japan has reinterpreted its constitution to permit “counterstrike capabilities,” allowing it to target enemy bases in response to an attack.
Beyond hardware, Tokyo is reimagining its strategic relationships. While maintaining the U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of its security strategy, Japan has pursued new security partnerships, including the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Australia and the 2024 RAA with the Philippines, Japan’s first such agreements in Asia. This creates a framework for Japanese troops and equipment to directly support the Philippines during crises in the South China Sea.
Australia’s strategic response differs markedly from Japan’s yet reflects similar underlying concerns. Historically reliant on U.S. naval power while focusing on land forces, Australia is rapidly pivoting toward a maritime-focused defense posture that serves as both a hedge against U.S. decline and a complementary capability within the broader regional security architecture.
The centerpiece of Australia’s strategy is the AUKUS agreement, a trilateral security pact with the United States and the United Kingdom that will deliver nuclear-powered submarines to the Royal Australian Navy. By committing to nuclear propulsion technology, Australia is positioning itself to assume greater responsibility for deep-ocean deterrence missions traditionally handled by the U.S. Navy’s attack submarine fleet – precisely where the United States’ industrial limitations are most acute.
What makes Australia’s approach distinctive is its emphasis on maintaining strategic depth through diversified relationships. Australia has expanded security cooperation with Japan, executing joint exercises that strengthen maritime deterrence without direct U.S. facilitation. This hedging extends to Australia’s defense industrial base, with significant investments in domestic shipbuilding capabilities and partnerships throughout the region.
Perhaps no country better exemplifies the consequences of the United States’ capability-commitment gap than the Philippines. Situated at the nexus of South China Sea disputes and possessing limited indigenous defense capabilities, the Philippines faces daily confrontation with Chinese maritime coercion while navigating the uncertainties of its ally’s maritime decline.
The Philippines’ front-line position was made starkly apparent in recent confrontations at Second Thomas Shoal. In March 2024, the China Coast Guard conducted dangerous maneuvers and used water cannons against a Philippine supply vessel, resulting in minor injuries to seven crew members. These actions occurred despite U.S. naval assets in the region, revealing China’s calculation that a U.S. military presence would not translate into direct intervention.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has responded with a multifaceted approach combining enhanced U.S. cooperation, diversified security partnerships, and nascent capability development. The cornerstone is the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which has expanded from five to nine designated facilities for U.S. rotational forces, including bases facing the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait.
Recognizing the limitations of relying exclusively on U.S. capacity, the Philippines has aggressively pursued security relationships with other regional powers, announcing trilateral coast guard exercises with the U.S. and Japan and deepening military cooperation with Australia.
