The Quad is in good health, despite suggestions that it is being overtaken by other Indo-Pacific security initiatives. We saw its strength at the Quad Leaders’ Summit in Tokyo in late July.
In the past few years, the Quad has been joined by the Squad, comprising the United States, Australia, Japan and the Philippines, and by AUKUS and the proposition of an Asian NATO. All, to varying degrees, offer ways of reinforcing security in the Indo-Pacific in addition to the Quad, which groups Australia, India, Japan and the United States.
Yet India’s External Affairs Minister, S Jaishankar, said at the Tokyo meeting, the ‘Quad is here to stay, here to do, and here to grow.’
The joint statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo showcases the diverse agenda of the Quad, highlighting its commitment to maintaining a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. This agenda spans various sectors, including outer space, cyber security, artificial intelligence, health security, infrastructure building, sea lane protection, climate-impact measures and supply chain resilience. It demonstrates the Quad’s substantial and multifaceted cooperative efforts.
Greater focus on the issues of immediate neighborhood concern to member countries, such as Myanmar, state-sponsored terrorism in South Asia, North Korea, Pacific island countries, Houthi attacks in the Indian Ocean region, and even the Middle East and Ukraine, demonstrate the collective understanding and efforts to safeguard the region from instability and upheavals.
It is also worth noting that, during the meeting, Australia announced the launch of the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre, a critical initiative to boost reliable connectivity and the growth of the digital economy.
These efforts aim to fill gaps and strengthen capacities across multiple sectors to safeguard the current rules-based order and protect it from disruptive actions by revisionist powers. The Quad members are united by shared threats and a collective intent to reap economic and trade benefits and to promote Indo-Pacific stability and security, countering Beijing’s narrative and influence over regional players.
Among those who play down the value of the Quad, Ashley Tellis says: ‘In militarised crises and conflict with China, the mini-laterals like AUKUS and the Squad and, most importantly, the US–Japan alliance, will prove to be far more important than the Quad.’
But the Quad’s focus on a rules-based order and extended maritime domain awareness positions it as a softer but more systematic power alternative to Washington’s strategy for containing China’s growing assertiveness in the region. This approach aims to build regional trust and confidence, distinguishing the Quad from AUKUS or the Squad, which focus on direct hard-power deterrence.
Unlike the Squad, the Quad emphasises trust-building and economic friendshoring. This strategy consolidates existing security measures and extends new safeguards to non-member nations, including ASEAN countries.
The Quad’s emphasis on extended maritime domain awareness sets it apart from other security-centric mini-laterals, which are limited by geographical and operational constraints. The Indian Ocean remains the central geo-security domain for the Quad, with the Indian Navy playing a crucial role in enhancing joint capacities and supporting extended maritime operations with contributions from the US Japan, and Australia.
As Jaishankar noted, the Quad’s strength lies in its foundation of democratic politics, pluralistic societies and market economies, stabilising factors in a volatile world. The diversity of Quad members’ capabilities and offerings across diverse domains ensures a resonant and aligned partnership, providing a credible and resilient alternative to China’s propositions or those of any individual Quad member.
