“All forms of media is propaganda, we’re just more honest about it.” So declares the social media profile of Zhao DaShuai, a member of the People’s Armed Police Propaganda Bureau. Chinese strategy is often characterized by its reliance on deception, but like so many authoritarian regimes, the Chinese Communist Party often says exactly what it’s doing and why it’s doing it.
It is through this lens of propaganda and political warfare that China watchers should analyze the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) “punishment exercises” around Taiwan, collectively referred to as Joint Sword 2024A. Billed by Beijing as a response to the inaugural address of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te on May 20, these exercises positioned Chinese air and naval assets in areas around Taiwan that would allow Beijing to isolate or impose a blockade on the island.
When viewed in concert with China’s sustained pressure campaign against Taiwan, an acceleration of Chinese shipbuilding that increasingly dwarfs Western naval production, and a growing Chinese missile inventory with increasing threat ranges, one can easily see a bleak picture of Chinese invincibility. The message is clear: It is futile to resist a Chinese military seizure of Taiwan. US allies and partners who consider defending Taiwan may question the feasibility and value of intervening against such a powerful foe as China. And Taiwanese policymakers and voters may be intimidated by the giant whose fist overshadows their entire island nation. If resistance is futile, then reducing the pain of a future unification could be the smarter choice for Taiwan and the world.
This impression is exactly the effect that China seeks—a cognitive fait accompli. China wants the world to believe that it has already decisively won and that no one can do anything about it.
But looking past the propaganda, China’s real military strength, while dangerous, is less impressive and more brittle than Beijing would have the world believe. Nevertheless, China’s influence campaign could be effective if it reinforces what China watchers may already tend to believe. For example, the Associated Press has accidentally used a doctored photo from Chinese state media of PLA military exercises. The narrative filters out from there. Many newspapers, television, social media, and academia now all tell the same tale of Chinese overmatch. In short: It has all the doctrinal hallmarks of effective deception.
Russia ran a similar playbook prior to its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, depicting its military as an overpowering force. And while Russia is and remains an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, the Russian façade of invincibility was quickly exposed by fierce and sustained Ukrainian resistance against a foe with significant materiel and numerical advantages. It’s another riff on the story of David versus Goliath. What China and Russia fail to remember is that in that story, David wins.
Exposing this deception for what it is and revealing the Chinese vulnerabilities it seeks to cover requires a multipronged approach. First, policymakers and the analysts who inform them must understand the nature and depth of Beijing’s influence operations. Second, they must appreciate the relative weaknesses of China and strengths of Taiwan in an invasion scenario. Finally, they must comprehensively counter the narrative of overwhelming Chinese strength and inoculate their populations against malign Chinese influence activities.
These exercises were accompanied by a propaganda video, produced by China’s Eastern Theater Command, that showed an overwhelming volley of rockets striking targets in Taiwan. Slogans pronounced during the video state the intention of these strikes: “Destroy the pillar of Taiwanese independence! Strike the base camp of Taiwanese independence! Cut off the blood flow of Taiwanese independence!”
