As Washington deepens industrial ties with Japan, South Korea and Australia, Europe risks being left out unless it partners with its Asian allies.
quiet but decisive shift is underway in global naval powers. Nuclear-powered submarines — currently operated by only six countries including the United Kingdom and France — are becoming central to the military posture of American allies. Australia will acquire nuclear submarines under a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS). Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has now approved South Korea’s construction of a nuclear-powered submarine — already prompting debate in Japan.
As Washington’s Indo-Pacific alliances deepen their industrial maritime integration, the European Union risks strategic sidelining. The UK, through AUKUS, is already embedded in this emerging network. The EU is not. Unless it moves quickly, Europe could find itself watching the next era of naval cooperation unfold without it.
The EU should instead pursue deeper cooperation with East Asian allies — especially South Korea and Japan — starting with shipbuilding. The logic is clear: Europe must embrace friendshoring, the integration of supply chains among trusted partners.
Strategic autonomy through friendshoring, not protectionism
The urgency begins with industrial reality. US shipbuilding capacity is strained, even in naval yards, raising doubts about timely delivery of AUKUS submarines to Australia. In commercial shipbuilding, the US held just 0.11 % of the global market share in 2024, falling far behind China’s 53.3%, South Korea’s 29.1%, and Japan’s 13.1%, according to a CSIS report Europe’s shipbuilding remains competitive only in niche areas, despite operating about 35% of the world fleet.
These industrial imbalances are not merely economic — they are strategic. US allies in Europe and East Asia share an interest in sustaining US engagement in international security. Ironically, as the CSIS report explains, European and East Asian allies have instead subsidized China’s naval expansion by purchasing ships built in Chinese shipyards.
As the second Trump administration seeks to offload security responsibilities, European and East Asian allies are natural defence partners. In peacetime, they can cooperate in technological development, as in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between Japan, the UK, and Italy. In wartime, they can become important suppliers to one another. In 2023, for instance, South Korea indirectly provided more 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine than all of Europe combined.
But shared strategy does not erase industrial competition. For instance, Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean are the two finalists for Canada’s multi-billion-dollar submarine acquisition plan. With European shipbuilding supporting over a million direct and indirect jobs, political pressure for protectionism is intense. Left unchecked, these interests risk turning the pursuit of strategic autonomy into a defensive policy that weakens Europe’s competitiveness.
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