It’s all about geography. Greenland is important to the United States’ new Golden Dome missile-defence project because some of the most serious threats would approach the US by passing close to the North Pole.
So it helps a lot to put sensors, missiles and communications equipment up towards the pole.
Golden Dome is designed to provide comprehensive defence against a broad range of threats including long-range missiles and potentially advanced drones. These include Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). It is also intended to deal with long-range cruise missiles, including the emerging challenge posed by hypersonic weapons, and also fractional orbital bombardment systems, which are now possessed by both Russia and China.
With Golden Dome, the Trump Administration seeks to build a layered missile defence architecture, including space-based missile interceptor systems that are designed to destroy a ballistic missile in its boost phase, when it’s still accelerating shortly after launch. Golden Dome represents a significant pivot away from a limited ballistic missile defence capability of previous administrations. Like the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars, it is intended to counter large-scale missile attacks.
Greenland is important in two ways in relation to Golden Dome. Firstly, it’s under the flight paths of any ICBMs and SLBMs heading to the US from Russia’s arctic bastion. By forward-basing missile early-warning sensors and interceptors in ground installations closer to the threat, there’s a better chance of destroying those missiles earlier in flight.
Greenland-based interceptor missiles would provide the second line of defence, after the space-based interceptor systems that are the tip of Golden Dome’s spear. That second line would be well positioned to intercept an adversary ballistic missile early in its mid-course phase, when it’s coasting through space. The third layer of missile defence would be formed by existing systems in Alaska and California that would likely be expanded in scale. They could intercept later in the mid-course phase, or potentially in the terminal phase, when the missile is descending through the atmosphere.
Secondly, Greenland already hosts Pituffik (formerly Thule) Space Base, which is used for missile early warning and space domain awareness. But Greenland’s location also opens a new role in providing assured command and control of the space-based components of Golden Dome. The role of mesh networks in future command and control is critical in this regard. The US Department of War is pursuing what it calls a Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA) that is a ‘decentralised type of network that automatically configures and adapts itself to route data most efficiently’ between large constellations of small satellites in low-earth orbit. This approach will be the backbone of the Department of Defense’s Joint All Domain Command and Control concept, as well as Golden Dome. Pituffik is important because its high latitude location—and more broadly, the geography of Greenland itself—is ideal for supporting PWSA. Greenland’s cold, dry air is ideal for communications between the Earth and satellites in orbit by high-speed V-band radio and lasers.
The space-based leg of Golden Dome faces challenges in command and control from lower latitudes, because space-based interceptors must go over or near the North Pole to reach incoming ballistic missiles. So routing communications through ground stations in Greenland is preferable. The importance of Golden Dome’s space-based segments, both sensors and interceptors, is crucial if the system is to have any real chance of defeating a large missile attack in the boost phase or early in the mid-course phase. Greenland thus becomes an operational fulcrum upon which Golden Dome must operate.
There is justifiable scepticism about whether Golden Dome will work, and it will certainly be developed at great expense. The project timeline of three years probably won’t be met. Furthermore, Golden Dome will confront the technological, cost and program challenges that almost certainly mean it will never be leak-proof, and there will always be a need for a credible nuclear deterrent to back up Golden Dome. Certainly, the political and international security implications also need to be considered, ranging from whether such a capability will strengthen or undermine the stability of deterrence, through to the need to work with allies and partners rather than challenge their vital interests.
The US should now work with its partners in NATO towards a mutual agreement that could see additional infrastructure on Greenland necessary to support Golden Dome. Discussions occurred at the 2026 Davos World Economic Forum, held from 19 to 23 January, but details are few and vague. What would be important is that Golden Dome has the necessary infrastructure and systems in Greenland for providing the critical command and control capabilities to support a PWSA that is vital to support the space segment of Golden Dome. If it doesn’t include this, then Golden Dome will be much less effective in defeating missile threats. There is a clear need for agreement that respects Greenland’s interests and Denmark’s sovereignty while enhancing US and allied missile defence against growing threats from Russia, China and North Korea.
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